I am curious whether Buddhist divination is known (like ancient Greek say) to produce "orphic" predictions, ones that are liable to be misunderstood because they are cleverly ambiguous. I believe I have found an example (in China in 328 AD) but I would like to know if this a general thing that has been discussed (like in the case of Ancient Greece).

How would one explain when Buddha said in Mahānidāna Sutta, that "rūpakāye adhivacanasamphasso" and "nāmakāye paṭighasamphasso". The meaning of this?

Please don't move this to the Philosophy stack unless absolutely necessary. My personal belief in an afterlife is based on: 1. Being indefinite about "what is now?" 2. I assume that "my death" is semantically precise in some way, it's clear what we all mean by that 3. Linking these two, in terms of the impossibility of vague identity. Some people might object to my version of time or death, so while I am more interested in understanding 'vague identity', I cannot yet get started rhetorically. What's going on here? Which of these moves are allowed in the language game?

In saccapabba of mahāsatipaṭṭhānasutta:

1. Jāti is "khandhānaṃ patubhāvo" and "āyatanānaṃ paṭilābho".
2. Khandhānaṃ patubhāvo included viññāṇa-khandha.
1. Viññāṇa-khandha is viññāṇa-paṭiccasamuppāda.
2. Rūpa-paṭiccasamuppāda is rūpa-khandha.
3. Nāma-paṭiccasamuppāda is vedanā-, saññā-, saṇkhāra-khandha (cetana, phassa, manasikāra; see: sammādiṭṭhisuttaṃ).
3. Those nāma- and rūpa-paṭiccasamuppāda are piyarūpa/sātarūpa.
1. 60 piyarūpa/sātarūpa: 6 outer āyatana, 6 āyatana-paṭiccasamuppāda, 6 viññāṇa-paṭiccasamuppāda, and 42 nāma-paṭiccasamuppāda (6 vedana-paṭiccasamuppāda, 6 saññā-khandha, 6x5 saṇkhāra-khandha [phassa-paṭiccasamuppāda, cetanā-paṭiccasamuppāda, vitakka, vicāra, taṇhā-paṭiccasamuppāda]).

So jāti-paṭiccasamuppāda is viññāna-paṭiccasamuppāda. The difference is: Jāti-paṭiccasamuppāda is 5 khandha. So jāti is a conclusion of viññāna, nāma+rūpa, āyatana, phassa, vedanā, taṇhā, upādāna and bhavā-paṭiccasamuppāda. But viññāṇa-paṭiccasamuppāda is an explanation of jhāti. So sacca-pabba is the reason that commentary commented "Viññāṇa Is Jāti And Paṭisandhi", right?

Is it consistent to identify as a Buddhist while setting aside belief in supernatural elements described in the Pali canon such as devas , asuras , heavenly and hellish worlds, petas (ghosts), reincarnation etc.? Could one still be regarded as a follower of the Buddha if one adopts the Four Noble Truths, the Eightfold Path and the cultivation of insight, but considers devas, ghosts, hell realms and rebirth as allegorical or as cultural elements of ancient India rather than literal truths? Have there been respected teachers or schools that legitimized such a pragmatic or symbolic interpretation, and are there canonical sources that suggest the path can be followed to its end without subscribing to a literal acceptance of devas, ghosts, or rebirth? Or would such a position necessarily be viewed as heretical or heterodox within the Buddhist fold?

I've been going down a rabbit hole trying to understand the core logic of the early Buddhist path from a materialistic/agnostic standpoint, and I've arrived at a conclusion that feels both insightful and perhaps overly simplistic. I wanted to lay out my line of reasoning and see what you all think. My line of thought goes like this: The Goal is Nibbāna: The ultimate goal is the cessation of dukkha (suffering/dissatisfaction) and the end of the cycle of rebirth. Nibbāna and Annihilation: From an outside, secular perspective, Parinibbāna (the final Nibbāna after an enlightened being's death) looks like annihilation. The impermanent aggregation that an atheist/agnostic perceives as the "self" is gone and does not reappear. This taps into our deepest primal fear. The Doctrinal Solution is Anattā: The Buddha's core teaching to resolve this is Anattā (Not-Self). The argument is that it can't be annihilation because there was no permanent, solid "self" to be annihilated in the first place. What we are is an impermanent "congregation" of processes. The Training is Realizing Anattā: The entire meditative training, at its core, is about deconstructing our own experience to see this truth for ourselves—to move from intellectually accepting Anattā to directly realizing it. The Paradox for Both Believers and Atheists This creates an interesting situation. For a person who believes in rebirth, the ultimate goal of non-rebirth can seem frightening. Their instinct is often to desire a better rebirth, not an end to existence altogether. Conversely, for an atheist who already believes there is nothing after death, it might seem like they've already achieved the Buddhist goal of "no rebirth." However, the crucial distinction is psychological. The atheist may still fear the end of their existence out of instinct, while an enlightened person would meet that same end with equanimity. Therefore, for both the believer afraid of cessation and the non-believer afraid of their own mortality, the Buddhist meditative training serves as a tool to become psychologically at peace with the end of the process we call a "self." This leads me to my core idea: Is the entire project of Early Buddhism (and practices like the Thai Forest tradition) essentially just psychological engineering designed to solve the problem of death anxiety? It feels like the fear of personal annihilation is the "final boss" of human suffering, and the doctrine of Anattā is the specific weapon designed to defeat it. By training the mind to see through the illusion of the very "self" we're afraid of losing, the therapy is complete, and the fear is uprooted. I realize this might be a reductionist take. I'm curious how this framing sits with you all. Is this a fair, if incomplete, way to look at the central mechanism of the path? Or does putting too much emphasis on the "death" aspect miss the point entirely? Looking forward to your thoughts.

I'm writing an article comparing Buddhist accounts of perception with modern concepts in robotics (autonomous driving) and cognitive science (e.g., Andy Clark’s Surfing Uncertainty). I am particularly interested in the term *nimitta*, which Andriy Volkov describes as a “defining characteristic” of an object rather than the object itself (I'm not talking about *nimitta* that arises in the context of *kasina* meditation). Note: I've started to write up a document on nimitta where I try to be specific about the term and my intended use. I'll reference this discussion in the document. My questions are: 1. Does nimitta ever refer to the object itself, or only to its facets or identifying features? 2. Would it be accurate, within the framework of Buddhist philosophy, to describe nimitta as an “internal representation”?

It's a bit weird to explain. In daily life when I notice some though or emotion or when someone praises me or some other similar action and I notice that and don't cling on to it there is a inner voice praising myself for not getting attached. And if I "let that go" then again an inner voice praising that action and not getting attached to that feeling and this kind of creates a loop. It might sounds very weird or trivial but sometimes its very annoying. How should one deal with this? Just ignore it?

Is the systematic quality of something baked into intent? Suppose I systematically deceive vs a slip of the tongue: is it just as bad?

Given what I assume was the predominant view of the time, I would not be surprised if there are many Suttas that deal explicitly with resurrection (as opposed to rebirth which seems to be a more recent word used to delineate the concept), but I am interested in finding out in which sutras did Buddha Shakyamuni deal explicitly with annihilationism (ucchedavāda) which, as I understand it, is the position of the dissolution of the self after death (of which materialism would be a subset). I am aware of the following Suttas: - Brahmajāla-sutta -- which covers a large array of positions of wrong arguments against annhilationism, but doesn't seem to go into too much detail on how it is a wrong view. - Alagaddūpama-sutta -- in which The Buddha instructs on how to defend his position from being confused with annihilationism. - Pālileyya-sutta -- not sure exactly how to interpret this, but it seems to be about assuaging the fear of annihilation. - Achela Kassapa-sutta -- where the Buddha states the middle way between eternalism and annihilationism. - Aggi-Vacchagotta Sutta -- where The Buddha separates his view from all conventional views. - Kalama Sutta -- where The Buddha explains the benefits of the path even if there is nothing after death. Are there any glaring misconceptions here? Are there any other Suttas dealing with this topic?

I-laden Mantras that seek to 'influence' or 'implant' thoughts, like - i am peaceful - i am silent - i am loving especially in the face of unskillful thought, are supposed to purify the mind, but are adding thoughts and a sense of self. Nibbana is defined in part as the absence of unskillful thought, but Anatta is also part of it. Also, there is much advice not to fight thoughts. If we create an I-ness around one side of the aisle (love), and thoughts arise that stand in it's shadow (hate), have we not set ourselves up for suffering, or an identity crisis? Are such mantras and chanting therefore unhelpful, or at least, promoting an infight, perhaps even an I-ness? How does buddhism reconcile this?

# Which mantra would be most beneficial for my specific recovery situation? I'm a college student dealing with eating disorder patterns, childhood trauma, and social isolation. Currently in therapy + medication, but want to add a daily mantra practice as complementary support. **Background on my struggles:** - **Eating patterns**: Cycles of restriction → binge → shame that developed during adolescence. Food was used as both comfort and expression of care in my family, but within an otherwise difficult dynamic. - **Past trauma**: Experienced physical discipline/violence during childhood for minor mistakes. Still have nightmares and hypervigilance. Even though family relationships have improved significantly, I struggle to trust the changes are permanent. - **Current state**: Social isolation, constant threat-detection mode, negative self-talk patterns. Eating episodes get triggered by perceived social rejection or academic stress. I find myself scanning environments for potential threats. - **Spiritual background**: Currently practicing with a local Plum Village group (Thich Nhat Hanh tradition), so I'm already in the Zen/Mahayana space. **The three mantras I'm considering:** 1. **Om Mani Padme Hum** - Compassion cultivation 2. **Medicine Buddha mantra** - Healing focused 3. **Green Tara mantra** - Protection from fears **My question**: Given my specific trauma pattern (broken safety/protection system leading to hypervigilance and self-hatred), which mantra would likely have the most therapeutic benefit? I think Green Tara would be beneficial for my core issue of feeling fundamentally unsafe in the world, which then triggers the binge cycles when I perceive social threats. But I also wonder if the self-compassion work of Om Mani Padme Hum might be more foundational. Has anyone with similar trauma/eating disorder patterns found one of these particularly helpful? I know this isn't a substitute for therapy - just looking for what might work best as a complementary daily practice. **Note**: I'm already doing weekly therapy + SSRI medication + daily mindfulness meditation. The part in the 12 Step program where you are specifically required to trust in a "higher power" inspired me that maybe I need something like this to. So I wonder if there's anything within the Buddhist framework that could fill that gap. I'm worried about sectarian conflict, though. Is it even okay to practice these Tibetan chants if I'm practicing in a modernized, engaged, mindfulness-focused version of Vietnamese Zen?

I was attempting to find suttas that use the term 'kusala' in a mundane context, such as: > In some past lives, past existences, past abodes the Realized One was > reborn as a human being. He firmly and persistently undertook **skillful** > behaviors such as good conduct by way of body, speech, and mind, > giving and sharing, taking precepts, observing the sabbath, paying due > respect to mother and father, ascetics and brahmins, honoring the > elders in the family, and various other things pertaining to skillful > behaviors. > > Yampi, bhikkhave, tathāgato purimaṁ jātiṁ purimaṁ bhavaṁ purimaṁ > niketaṁ pubbe manussabhūto samāno daḷhasamādāno ahosi **kusalesu** > dhammesu, avatthitasamādāno kāyasucarite vacīsucarite manosucarite > dānasaṁvibhāge sīlasamādāne uposathupavāse matteyyatāya petteyyatāya > sāmaññatāya brahmaññatāya kule jeṭṭhāpacāyitāya aññataraññataresu ca > adhikusalesu dhammesu. > > Due to performing, accumulating, heaping up, and amassing those deeds, > when his body broke up, after death, he was reborn in a good place, a > heavenly realm. > > So tassa kammassa kaṭattā upacitattā ussannattā vipulattā kāyassa > bhedā paraṁ maraṇā sugatiṁ saggaṁ lokaṁ upapajjati. > > [DN 30](https://suttacentral.net/dn30/en/sujato?lang=en&layout=linebyline&reference=pts¬es=none&highlight=false&script=latin) Are there others? If so, please list as many as we know.

This question may be related to the [Dr. Alexander Wynne question](https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/q/53914/8157) . The Visuddhimagga says: > This has been said by the Blessed One, “This dependent origination is profound, Ánanda, and profound it appears” (D II 55; S II 92). And the profundity is fourfold as we shall explain below (XVII.304f.); but there is none of that in simple arising. And this dependent origination is explained [by the teachers] as adorned with the fourfold method (XVII.309); but there is no [need of] any such tetrad of methods in simple arising. So dependent origination is not simple arising, since that (i.e., simple arising) admits of no profound treatment > > **It is ungrammatical: this word paticca** (lit. “having > depended”; freely “due to,” “dependent”), [being a gerund of the verb > pati + eti, to go back to], **establishes a meaning** [in a formula of > establishment by verb] **when it is construed as past with the same > subject** [as that of the principal verb], **as in the sentence “Having > depended on** (paticca = ‘due to’) **the eye and visible objects, eye- > consciousness arises** **(uppajjati)**” (S II 72). **But if it is construed > here with the word uppáda (arising),** [which is a noun], **in a formula > of establishment by noun, there is a breach of grammar, because there > is no shared subject** [as there is in above-quoted sentence], **and so it > does not establish any meaning al all. So the dependent origination is > not simple arising because that is ungrammatical.** > > [Page 356](https://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/nanamoli/PathofPurification2011.pdf) Alternative translation: > Because of a difference in word usage, the word paṭicca (‘depending > on’) ordinarily makes sense when used with the same agent and with > reference to an earlier time. For example: ‘**Dependent on (paticca)** eye and > forms, eye-consciousness **arises (uppajjati)**’ (SN II 43). But here, when it is > combined with the term **uppāda (‘arising’)**, which expresses the sense > of existence, since there is no common agent, the word changes its > usage and adds nothing to the meaning. Thus, even on the basis of word > analysis, paṭiccasamuppāda cannot mean simply ‘mere arising.’ What is Buddhaghosa's salient point in this text about paticca-uppajjati versus paticca-sam-uppáda?

In his video [The Different Accounts of Dependent Origination in the Mahatanha-sankhaya Sutta (MN 38)](https://youtu.be/4I3OUG5yycg?si=oZwl6JMmQCB2Aj8D) , some things Dr. Alexander Wynne says are: * Dependent origination explains continuity over lives without a soul (Atman). * There is also a focus on what is happening in the present to conquer your suffering. * MN 38 has three doctrines; three versions of dependent origination. * Sati understands Dhamma as Upanishadic essentialism; that this consciousness transmigrates. * Buddha puts Sati in place by explaining Dependent Origination. * **The core of MN 38 is Buddha explains the dependent origination of consciousness with fire similes.** MN 38 should/could end at this point. * There is a **mysterious hard to understand discussion about "what has come into being". The Buddha does not say what has come into being.** Later, Wynne says: "The Buddha is talking about consciousness that comes into being (bhuta; sambhava)" and says Buddhaghosa was wrong saying Buddha was referring to the five aggregates that comes into being. * It gets more difficult when four nutriments are discussed. This section jumps out away from present moment consciousness. Here, moved from the present moment focus to continuity over time. * Then there is a section where the "subject" of transmigration is named; an entity being reborn; the "gandhabba"; ordinarily a type of "god" in Vedic texts. * The closing of MN 38 saying "concise discourse"; yet the sutta is long therefore people over time added things due to its length. * How has the text been expanded? What has been added? Section 3 about the four nutriments has been added. Subtle conceptual difference. One tradition has been moved in from another tradition. Do we have any disagreements with Dr. Alexander Wynne? Which one's? Why?

I have seen some people doubting the reliability of the Tripitaka. They say it is not the Buddha’s word, since it was written down about 400 years after his death. What historical evidence can prove the **level** of reliability of the Tripitaka?

We can give examples of how things can continue without any permanent entity, like fire burning wood. It is not the wood, the fire, the space, or the floor that is fixed — everything is changing. But how can anyone demonstrate how karma, habits, and memories follow us? Where are they stored, if they are stored at all? If they are stored, are they unchanging? Did the Buddha give examples of where these habits or karma “stay” and follow us? I don’t see any examples for this. Can anyone describe it? This is something most people struggle with, and people from other religions often question. If there isn’t any solid explanation or way to demonstrate it, then it seems to undermine the idea.

Can you quickly explain "everything is impermanent"? Is it metaphysical or ontological claim, that nothing that "exists" will exist forever? Or is it a claim that nothing can always be (meaning having that nature, rather than 'exist') anything? If not that latter, does Buddhism universally agree that there is no *awareness* of something being what it is, without existence? ---------- Can I be aware of, for example, a shape being red without existence and "permanently" in the standard way of using that word, even if "everything is impermanent"?

In Islam the God is Allah, in Christianity the God is Jehovah and Jesus Christ. Is the God in Buddhism Buddha? I think it is very misleading to say that the name of the God in Buddhism is Buddha! Buddha is not a God's name but Buddha is rather an enlightenment condition. Does Buddhism have a particular God? My ultimate question is whether Buddhism was made by God or humans.

Sujato's translation of MN 72, similar to other translations of MN 72, says: > That’s why a Realized One is freed with the ending, fading away, > cessation, giving up, and letting go of all conceiving, all churning, > and all I-making, mine-making, or underlying tendency to conceit, I > say.” > > Tasmā tathāgato sabbamaññitānaṁ sabbamathitānaṁ > sabbaahaṅkāramamaṅkāramānānusayānaṁ khayā virāgā nirodhā cāgā > paṭinissaggā anupādā vimuttoti vadāmī”ti. > > “But worthy Gotama, when a mendicant’s mind is freed like this, where > are they reborn?” > > “Evaṁ vimuttacitto pana, bho gotama, bhikkhu kuhiṁ upapajjatī”ti? > > “‘They’re reborn’ doesn’t apply, Vaccha.” > > “Upapajjatīti kho, vaccha, na upeti”. > > “Well then, are they not reborn?” > > “Tena hi, bho gotama, na upapajjatī”ti? > > “**‘They’re not reborn’ doesn’t apply**, Vaccha.” > > “**Na upapajjatīti kho**, vaccha, **na upeti**”. > > “Well then, are they both reborn and not reborn?” > > “Tena hi, bho gotama, upapajjati ca na ca upapajjatī”ti? > > “‘They’re both reborn and not reborn’ doesn’t apply, Vaccha.” > > “Upapajjati ca na ca upapajjatīti kho, vaccha, na upeti”. > > “Well then, are they neither reborn nor not reborn?” > > “Tena hi, bho gotama, neva upapajjati na na upapajjatī”ti? > > “‘They’re neither reborn nor not reborn’ doesn’t apply, Vaccha.” > > “Neva upapajjati na na upapajjatīti kho, vaccha, na upeti”. > > [MN 72](https://suttacentral.net/mn72/en/sujato?lang=en&layout=linebyline&reference=none¬es=none&highlight=false&script=latin) Why are Arahants not 'not reborn'?