In the Dīgha Nikāya 15 (DN 15), the Mahānidāna Sutta, the Buddha outlines a a complex stratification of "seven stations of consciousness" and "two dimensions" > “Ānanda, there are these seven stations of consciousness and two > dimensions. Which seven? > > “There are **beings with multiplicity of body and multiplicity of > perception,4 such as human beings, some devas, and some beings in the > lower realms. This is the first station of consciousness.** > > “There are **beings with multiplicity of body and singularity of > perception, such as the Devas of Brahmā’s Retinue generated by the > first (jhāna) and (some) beings in the four realms of deprivation.5 > This is the second station of consciousness.** > > “There are **beings with singularity of body and multiplicity of > perception, such as the Radiant Devas. This is the third station of > consciousness.** > > “There are **beings with singularity of body and singularity of > perception, such as the Beautiful Black Devas. This is the fourth > station of consciousness.** > > “There are **beings who, with the complete transcending of perceptions > of (physical) form, with the disappearance of perceptions of > resistance, and not heeding perceptions of multiplicity, (perceiving,) > ‘Infinite space,’ arrive at the dimension of the infinitude of space. > This is the fifth station of consciousness.** > > “There are **beings who, with the complete transcending of the dimension > of the infinitude of space, (perceiving,) ‘Infinite consciousness,’ > arrive at the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness.** **This is > the sixth station of consciousness.** > > “There are beings who, **with the complete transcending of the dimension > of the infinitude of consciousness, (perceiving,) ‘There is nothing,’ > arrive at the dimension of nothingness. This is the seventh station of > consciousness.** > > **“The dimension of non-percipient beings and, second, the dimension of > neither perception nor non-perception. [These are the two dimensions.]** ~ DN 15 Is the Buddha here describing subjective, internal states of consciousness that can be directly known in meditation, or externally existing cosmological realms that other beings inhabit? This ambiguity is especially pronounced in the case of the “dimension of infinite consciousness.” Is this to be understood as a temporary mental perception - an internal expansion of awareness beyond form - or does it point to a more ontological reality in which consciousness itself is experienced as boundless? If so, what does this imply about the nature of consciousness: is it something objectively infinite by nature, or is any perception of “infinite consciousness” merely a constructed meditative perception, still within the conditioned world, and thus ultimately impermanent?

In academic discussions of early Buddhism, the Pāli Nikāyas are often regarded as the oldest extant records of the Buddha’s teachings. Studying the Pāli Canon, one often encounters detailed dialogues between the Buddha and various individuals (e.g., monks, brahmins, kings, and wanderers). These exchanges are frequently presented with specific narrative settings, named interlocutors, and structured philosophical arguments. The key question is how scholars and informed practitioners evaluate their historical reliability: To what extent can these dialogues be read as records of real conversations, and to what extent should they be read as later literary compositions shaped for doctrinal clarity or pedagogical purposes? Take for instance, how in certain suttas, the Buddha is depicted engaging in dialogue with various Brahmins identified with well-known Vedic lineages or names such as Vāseṭṭha (cf. Vasistha), Bhāradvāja (cf. Bharadvaja), and Assalāyana (cf. Asvalayana). These figures are significant because their names correspond to ancient ṛṣi lineages that, within the Brahmanical tradition itself, are often placed many centuries if not millennia prior to the historical Buddha. This raises a historical-critical problem: Are the individuals named in these suttas intended to be the same as the ancient Vedic sages, or are these names better understood as referring to later Brahmins belonging to those gotras (lineages) rather than the original figures themselves? if these names refer to the same figures as those of the Vedic tradition, then the dialogues appear chronologically implausible. On the other hand, if they refer to later Brahmins bearing inherited lineage names (gotras), then the issue may be resolved differently. Broadly, How do scholars in Buddhist Studies assess the historical reliability of narrative exchanges in the Pāli Suttas, especially when they involve figures whose identities may be symbolic, anachronistic, or traditionally mythologized?

In DN 27 , the Buddha describes beings at the beginning of a world-cycle as:- > There comes a time when, after a very long period has passed, this > cosmos expands. As the cosmos expands, sentient beings mostly pass > away from that host of radiant deities and come back to this > realm.**Here they are mind-made, feeding on rapture, self-luminous**, > wandering in midair, steadily glorious, and they remain like that for > a very long time. These beings (often associated with the Ābhassara Brahmā realm) are said to precede differentiation into gross materiality, sexual distinction, and even external light sources such as the sun and moon, which only become apparent after their luminosity fades In standard early Buddhist analysis, individuation is typically explained in terms of distinct streams of aggregates conditioned by ignorance and craving. However, in this primordial phase, the narrative appears to precede the emergence of precisely those differentiating conditions tied to coarse embodiment and structured sensory fields. This seems to raise a problem about how plurality is being conceived in this passage. One possibility is that individuation is grounded in distinct streams of consciousness, even in the absence of coarse material support. But if that is the case, it is not immediately clear how this fits with standard formulations of dependent origination, where consciousness and name-and-form are mutually conditioning, and where the six sense bases play a central role in structuring experience. If the relevant differentiating structures have not yet arisen, in what sense can there already be numerically distinct continua? Another possibility is that “self-luminosity” (sayaṃ-pabhā) implies some form of self-manifestation that could ground individuation internally rather than externally. But this raises a further difficulty. If each being is self-manifesting in a way that secures its distinctness, doesn't this risk introducing a subtle form of intrinsic identity that would be difficult to reconcile with anattā?

In the early Buddhist cosmological framework, the “formless realms” (arūpa-lokā) namely the spheres of infinite space, infinite consciousness, nothingness, and neither-perception-nor-non-perception are frequently described as planes of rebirth accessible through mastery of the corresponding immaterial attainments (arūpa-samāpatti). However, the precise ontological status of beings reborn in these realms remains ambiguous. ---------- **1. What constitutes the “individual” in the arūpa realms?** If rūpa is entirely absent, are such beings to be understood purely in terms of residual viññāṇa (consciousness), or as configurations of the remaining aggregates (vedanā, saññā, saṅkhāra, viññāṇa)? **2. How should we interpret the apparent continuity of identity in these realms?** Do the Nikāyas support a model of minimal subjectivity (e.g., “bare consciousness”), or do they resist any substantialist reading even at this level?

In discussions pertaining to early Buddhist doctrine, One often encounters the Pāli term punabbhava (Skt. punarbhava) within the suttas which is frequently translated as "rebirth" or "reincarnation". ( E.g natthi dāni punabbhavo’ti. ~ SN 56.11) Both English terms however carry significant metaphysical baggage, particularly implying notions of a persisting entity (atta/ātman) which the Nikāyas explicitly problematize. Modern scholarship and traditional exegetes appear divided on its interpretation. Some interpret punabbhava in line with conventional “rebirth” models, emphasizing continuity in future lives without identity.Still others suggest that punabbhava refers less to post-mortem destiny and more to moment-to-moment existential re-arising conditioned by craving. Questions for consideration:- 1. Are there any passages in the Nikāyas where punabbhava unambiguously requires a literal multi-life rebirth interpretation? 2. Conversely, are there contexts where reading it as an ongoing psychological/existential process (rather than post-mortem rebirth) better fits the textual evidence? 3. In the context of paṭicca-samuppāda, is punabbhava better understood temporally (across lifetimes) or phenomenologically (moment-to-moment arising)? 4. How do the commentaries ( e.g Aṭṭhakathā) interpret punabbhava, and should their readings be privileged in determining its meaning? 5. Is the ambiguity in punabbhava best understood as a deliberate feature of early Buddhist discourse, allowing both cosmological and phenomenological interpretations?

Udāna 8.1 describes what appears to be a radically transcendent “dimension” — one beyond the elements, the formless attainments, and even beyond movement, time, and dualistic perception. It is characterized entirely by negation, culminating in the phrase: "just this is the end of stress/suffering."- > There is that dimension where there is neither earth, nor water, nor > fire, nor wind; neither dimension of the infinitude of space, nor > dimension of the infinitude of consciousness, nor dimension of > nothingness, nor dimension of neither perception nor non-perception; > neither this world, nor the next world, nor sun, nor moon. And there, > I say, there is neither coming, nor going, nor staying; neither > passing away nor arising: unestablished, unevolving, without support > (mental object). This, just this, is the end of stress. Have any advanced practitioners, past or present, claimed to have directly realized this dimension? If so: - How was the realization described? Was it marked by total cessation, a kind of knowing without content, or something altogether ineffable? - Was there awareness during the experience? Or did it resemble the cessation of perception and feeling (nirodha-samāpatti), with no consciousness during and only retrospective insight after? - How was the transition into and out of this dimension understood? Did it feel like a gradual absorption, a sudden drop, or a shift beyond all experience? - Did practitioners interpret it as a momentary event or as the uncovering of a timeless truth? In other words, is this dimension entered, or is it recognized as always already the case? - What changed after the experience? Were there shifts in perception, identity, or sense of reality that aligned with the description of “no coming, no going” and “no this world or another world”? ---------- I understand that language may fall short in describing such a realization, but I’m curious whether any teachings or testimonies exist that give practical or phenomenological insight into what this “dimension” might entail — and whether realization is framed as a momentary insight or an ongoing mode of liberation.

In early Buddhist texts, there are instances when Nirvana is explicitly referred to as an “element” (nibbāna-dhātu) for instance in the Nibbānadhātusutta. Ud 8.1 likewise seems to refer to it as a sense object (ayatana) This terminology is confusing to me. If Nirvana is the cessation of all aggregates and not a conditioned phenomenon, calling it an “element” makes it sound like some kind of ultimate existent or metaphysical substrate. How should the term “element” (dhātu) be understood in this context. Is it meant in a strictly technical sense within early Buddhist thought, or is it more of a conventional designation for the cessation of processes rather than something that exists as a thing.

In AN 8.51 The following passages are to be seen - > A nun should not abuse or insult a monk in any way. This principle > should be honored, respected, esteemed, and venerated, and not > transgressed so long as life lasts. > > **From this day forth it is forbidden for nuns to criticize monks, but > it is not forbidden for monks to criticize nuns.** This principle should > be honored, respected, esteemed, and venerated, and not transgressed > so long as life lasts Is this rule understood within Broader Buddhist tradition as an authentic teaching of the Buddha, and if so, what rationale is given for allowing criticism in only one direction?

The wikipedia page for [Buddhist Cosmology](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buddhist_cosmology#Origins) has a section titled "Origins" in which the following sentence occurs: >No single sūtra sets out the entire structure of the universe, but in several sūtras the Buddha describes other worlds and states of being, and other sūtras describe the origin and destruction of the universe. I am interested in reading these sūtras, in which the Buddha describes other worlds and states of being, but I am not sure what they are. Does anyone know what sūtras the author of the article is referring to?

Buddhist scriptures describe numerous supranormal phenomena such as the existence of devas (gods), multiple cosmological realms such as heaven and hell, and the continuity of consciousness or reincarnation that are inaccessible to ordinary sensory perception and cannot be established through conventional inference. This raises a question about the nature of scriptural authority across Buddhist traditions. Do schools such as Theravāda, Mahāyāna, or Vajrayāna treat scripture or scriptural revelations as independent, authoritative proof of such phenomena, in a manner analogous to how śruti functions in Hindu Vedānta, where the text itself serves as an epistemic source? Or are these teachings primarily seen only as guiding principles for ethical conduct, meditative practice, and direct experiential verification, rather than as conclusive evidence of supranormal realities? References to classical texts, commentaries, or doctrinal discussions that clarify whether the status of scriptural proof in Buddhism is regarded as epistemically authoritative for realities beyond perception and inference would be especially illuminating.

In the early strata of the Pāli Canon,in discussions of dependent origination in the Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhaya Sutta and the Mahānidāna Sutta, consciousness or viññāṇa is repeatedly characterized as dependently arisen (paṭiccasamuppanna), specific to its object (e.g., cakkhuviññāṇa, sotaviññāṇa), and lacking any underlying unity apart from causal continuity. In contrast, Yogācāra sources such as the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra and systematic expositions in the Yogācārabhūmi-Śāstra systematize a layered model of consciousness introducing the concept of ālayavijñāna as a subliminal, foundational consciousness that serves as the repository of karmic seeds (bīja) and the basis for the arising of the six manifest cognitive consciousnesses. Though described as momentary and dependently arisen, it appears to function as a unifying and enduring āśraya (support) for saṃsāric continuity. The question, which then arises is that Do the Nikāyan materials when interpreted without later Theravāda Abhidhamma categories contain any conceptual space for a structurally analogous substrate, or is Yogācāra’s ālayavijñāna a divergent theoretical innovation? Further Does the mutual conditioning of viññāṇa and nāma-rūpa in DN 15 imply a recursive continuity that could support a proto-ālaya interpretation, or is this reading anachronistic?

Is this Aṅguttara Nikāya (AN 5.230)sutta true? Is it translated to English from the Pali correctly? >AN 5.230 Numbered Discourses 5.230 >23. Long Wandering Black Snakes (2nd) “Mendicants, there are these five drawbacks of a black snake. What five? It’s irritable, acrimonious, venomous, fork-tongued, and treacherous. These are the five dangers of a black snake. >In the same way there are five drawbacks of a lady. What five? She’s irritable, acrimonious, venomous, fork-tongued, and treacherous. This is a lady’s venom: usually she’s very lustful. This is a lady’s forked tongue: usually she speaks divisively. This is a lady’s treachery: usually she’s an adulteress. These are the five drawbacks of a lady.” https://suttacentral.net/an5.230/en/sujato?lang=en&layout=plain&reference=none¬es=asterisk&highlight=false&script=latin Ajahn Sujato says it's just wrong, but I wonder if its mistranslated. Are there any other suttas where the Buddha appears to believe things that seem to be born of kilesa. Do any Buddhists believe this sutta? How old is this sutta? I am thinking that that it must be a bad teaching that maybe some monk with too much kilesa slipped in there? >Ajahn Sujato: "And no, I don’t think this was really spoken by the Buddha. Deal with it. What I’m interested in is to subject this text to the same elementary standard that the Buddha himself insisted on, and that we would apply to any other truth claims: does it stack up against the evidence? I assume it doesn’t, but I’d like to see the proof. Does anyone know of any objective, empirically based psychological studies that statistically examine possible gender differences between men and women in these traits?"... https://sujato.wordpress.com/2010/12/05/is-this-sutta-true/ Unless I am just too unenlightened to understand, that sutta doesn't sound like the Buddha I follow. Is it in the context of meditation against sensual desire? Does this damage the reputation of the Buddha? Does the Buddha have to be completely perfect within our unenlightened understanding? That sutta seems impossible though. The Buddha did ordain Bhikkhunis so I was thinking this sutta must be a fraud, right?

*Sorry; part of this question is described in Chinese, as I cannot find their Pali or Sanskrit script; even if I can, I can't read them.* The Saddharmapundarika Sutra (法华经) quoted Buddha (Sakyamuni himself) once said about "Saddharma Vipralopa (末法)", the Ending Era in which Buddhism would become unpopular and weak (转复微末，谓末法时). Later commentary scripts claimed Buddha said "there is 500 years of correct Buddism, 1000 years of similar Buddhism and 3000 years of Ending Buddhism after my nirvana" (然佛所说，我灭度后，正法五百年，像法一千年，末法三千年). This saying is believed to be real but also there are different interpretation. Some source said Samyuktagama (杂阿含经) mentioned Ending Era (Saddharma Vipralopa) much earlier, but I didn't find. Based on the idea that Buddha said "500+1000 years after his nirvana, it is the Ending Era", the Mahayana Jingtu faction (净土宗) and 净土-influenced Tiantai faction (天台宗) thus believe we are now in the Ending Era of Buddhism, and developed a full system of getting liberated in this current era. These are, however, not accepted by Zen faction (禅宗), another major Mahayana faction in China. Zen believe the Ending Era is real but it is not that bad and the timetable is not referring to real time. > 末世众生愚痴钝根，不解如来三大阿僧祇秘密之说，遂言成佛尘劫未期，岂不疑误行人退菩提道。 I want to know, are these 3 creeds (below) also accepted in other factions of Buddhism, especially different factions of Theravada out of Sinosphere? Or, are these thoughts denied or left intentionally not to discuss? 1. There is an Ending Era of Buddhism after Buddha's nirvana. 2. The Ending Era is very bad, Buddhism becomes unpopular and wrong, and people are too stupid to get nirvana by themselves. 3. We are currently in this Ending Era. --------------- I think maybe some faction may deny the idea of Ending Era; for example, another translated book named "Ekottara Āgama (增壹阿含经)" said the Buddhism after Buddha will last forever and gain billions of believers. > 佛告阿难曰。我灭度之后。法当久存......东方弟子无数亿千。南方弟子无数亿千。是故。阿难。当建此意。我释迦文佛寿命极长。所以然者。肉身虽取灭度。法身存在。此是其义。当念奉行。 Maybe some of them is fake, wrong, or intepreted mistakenly. I don't know, and don't want to discuss which is correct and which is wrong, they are all ancient and said to be translated from India. My question is only, is there any other faction believe "it's the Ending Era now, the End is nigh!".

I have been practicing Vipassana for quite a while (2 and a half years). Now, I want to also dwell into the teachings of Buddha as presented in Suttas and apply those teaching in my everyday life. I have read a bit about the Majjhima Nikaya and the Samyutta Nikaya but I'm in a dilemma and not sure whether or not other Nikayas are suitable for a beginner. With which Sutta (Nikaya) should I start with?

In the Tevijja Sutta (DN 13 ), the Buddha addresses Brahmin students who are described as being learned in the Vedas and belonging to specific Brahmanical lineages. The sutta explicitly situates its interlocutors within the orthodox Vedic tradition, often identified within the Yajurvedic and Sāmavedic recensions:- > Even though brahmins describe different paths—the Adhvaryu brahmins, > the **Taittirīya brahmins, the Chāndogya brahmins**, the Cāndrāyaṇa > brahmins, and the Bahvṛca brahmins—all of them still lead someone who > practices them to the company of Divinity These Brahmins understood as followers of what I suppose were the Taittirīya and Chāndogya Upaniṣadic traditions of the time claim knowledge of the path to union or “company with Brahmā” (brahmasahavyatā). The Buddha responds by redefining the path to Brahmā not through birth, sacrifice, or Vedic recitation, but through the cultivation of the four brahmavihāras. > “So it seems that that mendicant is not encumbered with possessions, > and neither is the Divinity. Would a mendicant who is not encumbered > with possessions join together and converge with the Divinity, who > isn’t encumbered with possessions?” > > “Yes, worthy Gotama.” > > “Good, Vāseṭṭha! **It’s quite possible that a mendicant who is not > encumbered with possessions will, when the body breaks up, after > death, be reborn in the company of Divinity, who isn’t encumbered with > possessions.** Is the Buddha’s teaching of “Brahmasahavyatā” in the Tevijja Sutta intended as a normative soteriological teaching for Buddhists, or is it better understood as a skillful means (upāya) directed specifically at non-Buddhist Brahmins or Followers of Upanishadic traditions, reframing their own theological goal in ethical and meditative terms without endorsing it as final liberation (nibbāna)?

In the Aggivacchasutta (MN 72 ), the Buddha responds to Vacchagotta’s inquiry about the status of a tathāgata after the attainment of cessation by invoking the simile of a fire that has become quenched due to the exhaustion of its fuel:- > “But Vaccha, suppose they were to ask you: ‘This fire in front of you > that is quenched: in what direction did it go—east, south, west, or > north?’ How would you answer?” > > “It doesn’t apply, worthy Gotama. The fire depended on grass and logs > as fuel. When that runs out, and no more fuel is added, the fire is > reckoned to have become quenched due to lack of fuel.” > > “In the same way, Vaccha, any form by which a realized one might be > described has been given up, cut off at the root, made like a palm > stump, obliterated, and unable to arise in the future. A realized one > is freed from reckoning in terms of form. They’re deep, immeasurable, > and hard to fathom, like the ocean. **‘They’re reborn’, ‘they’re not > reborn’, ‘they’re both reborn and not reborn’, ‘they’re neither reborn > nor not reborn’—none of these apply.** > > Any feeling … perception … choices … consciousness by which a realized > one might be described has been given up, cut off at the root, made > like a palm stump, obliterated, and unable to arise in the future. A > realized one is freed from reckoning in terms of consciousness. > They’re deep, immeasurable, and hard to fathom, like the ocean. > **‘They’re reborn’, ‘they’re not reborn’, ‘they’re both reborn and not > reborn’, ‘they’re neither reborn nor not reborn’—none of these apply.”** I have questions about how this functions at a technical level within early Buddhist thought. 1. If the aggregates are indeed the sole conditions under which an individual can emerge and be identified, what is the precise significance of the Buddha’s negation of all four alternatives - reborn, not reborn, both, and neither? 2. Is the primary function of this passage to dissolve only to speculative fixation that obstructs liberation, or does it also imply a principled metaphysical account of why post-liberation or even post-mortem identity claims fail at the level of causal analysis? 3. Does the fire simile warrant the conclusion that once causal supports or aggregates are exhausted, questions framed in terms of existence or non-existence become category errors rather than unanswered questions?

> “There is, monks, an unborn, unbecome, unmade, unconditioned. If, > monks there were not that unborn, unbecome, unmade, unconditioned, you > could not know an escape here from the born, become, made, and > conditioned. But because there is an unborn, unbecome, unmade, > unconditioned, therefore you do know an escape from the born, become, > made, and conditioned.” ~ Ud 8.3 In contemporary discussions—particularly outside of Buddhist contexts, this passage is sometimes interpreted in a theistic or metaphysical sense, as pointing to an eternal, uncreated reality or an absolute ground of being that exists independently and “allows” for liberation.From this perspective, the statement “if there were not that unborn…” is read as implying a foundational ontological ground upon which conditioned phenomena depend. Within a Buddhist doctrinal framework, however, Nibbāna is often said to be neither a self nor a substance, and Buddhism explicitly rejects a creator God and eternal metaphysical essences. - Within early Buddhist doctrine, why is Nibbāna described using terms such as “unborn” and “unconditioned,” rather than simply as the cessation of suffering or defilements? - How should the conditional phrasing “If there were not that unborn…” be understood without reifying Nibbāna into an eternal substance or theistic absolute? - How do traditional Buddhist commentaries address or guard against eternalist or theistic readings of this passage?

In the Cūḷasuññatasutta (MN 121) , the Buddha discusses a meditative attainment characterized by “nothingness” which is then used as a predicate in an analysis of emptiness. > Furthermore, a mendicant—ignoring the perception of the dimension of > infinite space and the perception of the dimension of infinite > consciousness—focuses on the oneness dependent on the perception of > the dimension of nothingness. Their mind leaps forth, gains > confidence, settles down, and becomes decided in that perception of > the dimension of nothingness. They understand: ‘Here there is no > stress due to the perception of the dimension of infinite space or the > perception of the dimension of infinite consciousness. There is only > this modicum of stress, namely the oneness dependent on the perception > of the dimension of nothingness.’ They understand: ‘This field of > perception is empty of the perception of the dimension of infinite > space. It is empty of the perception of the dimension of infinite > consciousness. There is only this that is not emptiness, namely the > oneness dependent on the perception of the dimension of nothingness.’ > And so they regard it as empty of what is not there, but as to what > remains they understand that it is present. That’s how emptiness > manifests in them—genuine, undistorted, and pure. I am interested in an investigation that addresses such issues as: **Ontological status of “nothingness”:** ---------------------------------------- Is the sphere of nothingness presented as a phenomenal object of experience, a negation of specified classes of objects (e.g., form, infinite space, infinite consciousness), or as a structural absence of cognitive content? Phenomenological description: ----------------------------- In the Cūḷasuññatasutta, the meditator attends to the dimension of nothingness. How is it possible for the mind to intentionally “perceive” something that is, by definition, an absence? Does the sutta imply a particular structure of consciousness that allows an absence to be an object of experience? Nothingness and self-reference ------------------------------ In perceiving nothingness, does the meditator’s mind retain any self-referential awareness, or is subjectivity suspended? How does the sutta articulate the boundaries of selfhood and cognitive agency in relation to the sphere of nothingness? Temporal and spatial character of nothingness --------------------------------------------- The sutta uses the term āyatana, often translated as “dimension” or “sphere.” Does this imply that this nothingness has a kind of temporal or spatial extension, or is it entirely devoid of such characteristics?

While reading through the Buddhist suttas, I came across the detailed descriptions of the eight emancipations. These passages were deeply intriguing, but they also gave rise to some questions in my mind which I decided to ask before which let me cite the concerned passages - > “Ānanda, there are these eight emancipations. Which eight? > > “**Possessed of form, one sees forms.** This is the first > emancipation. > > “**Not percipient of form internally, one sees forms externally.** > This is the second emancipation. > > “**One is intent only on the beautiful.** This is the third > emancipation. > > “**With the complete transcending of perceptions of (physical) form, > with the disappearance of perceptions of resistance, and not heeding > perceptions of multiplicity, (perceiving,) ‘Infinite space,’ one > enters and remains in the dimension of the infinitude of space**. This > is the fourth emancipation. > > **“With the complete transcending of the dimension of the infinitude of space, (perceiving,) ‘Infinite consciousness,’ one enters and > remains in the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness.** This is > the fifth emancipation. > > **“With the complete transcending of the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness, (perceiving,) ‘There is nothing,’ one enters and > remains in the dimension of nothingness.** This is the sixth > emancipation. > > **“With the complete transcending of the dimension of nothingness, one enters and remains in the dimension of neither perception nor > non-perception.** This is the seventh emancipation. > > **“With the complete transcending of the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception, one enters and remains in the cessation > of perception and feeling.** This is the eighth emancipation. > > “**Now, when a monk attains these eight emancipations in forward > order, in reverse order, in forward and reverse order**, when he > attains them and emerges from them wherever he wants, however he > wants, and for as long as he wants, when through the ending of > effluents he enters and remains in the effluent-free release of > awareness and release of discernment, having directly known it and > realized it for himself in the here and now, **he is said to be a monk > released in both ways. And as for another release in both ways, higher > or more sublime than this, there is none.”** ~ DN 15 Questions- 1. Why is “nothingness” (6th) distinguished from “neither perception nor non-perception” (7th), given that both involve retreating from mental activity? Or from the 8th which involves total cessation of perception and feeling? 2. What kind of experience is “neither perception nor non-perception”? Is it a liminal state — and if so, how does one know they have entered it? Can a mind in this state be said to ‘experience’ anything at all? 3. In discussions with scholars from eternalist backgrounds, such as vedanta a common challenge raised is that the Buddhist teachings on the eight emancipations seem to imply the existence of a continuous or eternal subject since someone appears to be progressing through these subtle states of consciousness. If there is no eternal soul or self in Buddhism, then who is it that experiences and moves through these emancipations? How would a Buddhist respond to this objection? 4. What is the significance of being able to enter and exit these states at will, as emphasized in the sutta? 5. Is the progression through these states ultimately teaching that liberation is not something to be gained, but everything to be let go including perception, feeling, identity, and knowing?

In Kd 6 , We come across the following:- > On one occasion a monk was possessed by a spirit. His teacher and > preceptor who were nursing him were not able to cure him. He then went > to a pigs’ slaughterhouse to eat raw meat and drink blood. As a > result, he became well. They told the Buddha. > > “For one who is possessed, I allow raw meat and raw blood.” I had never heard of this before. I only encountered it because a polemical blog quoted it in an attempt to criticize Buddhist scripture by highlighting passages that seem negative or problematic when taken at face value. Since their intent of quoting the above was obviously hostile I’d like to understand the background of these from those familiar with the Vinaya:- My questions are: 1. Is the translation accurate? Does the Pali genuinely say that the Buddha allowed raw meat and raw blood in such circumstances? 2. Is this passage considered authentic and canonical within mainstream Theravāda? 3. If both of the above are true, How is this interpreted by traditional Buddhists today? Is it taken literally, regarded as a narrowly defined medicinal or exceptional allowance, or understood in some other way? And if it is accepted, how is it justified within Buddhist ethics and discipline?