What fault is found in denying Dharmakirti's notion of "substantial cause" as necessary in the arising of things?

I have read here argumentation for the continuity of mind, coming from a Geshe in Tibetan Buddhism. From what I have learnt it is asserted that: * Consciousness could not arise from matter (could not have matter as its ***substantial cause***). * It could not arise from nothing. * It could only arise from another moment of consciousness. Note: the definition of **"substantial cause"** above comes from Dharmakirti's Pramanavarttika. Has anyone come across a Buddhist argument why something could not have nothing as its substantial cause? What faulty logical consequences would follow? More specifically, I have in mind a situation when due to a higher being's act/wish, something comes into being. What comes into being is not transformed from another previous entity, but emerges "from nothing" merely due to the higher's act/wish. I would like to understand whether there are logical contradictions that would follow from the asserting this to be possible.