In researching Dependent Origination as described in SN 12.2 and using a basic Pali language guide (page 18), I found the following about each main Pali word: > **jarāmaraṇaṃ** singular from maraṇa neuter > > **jati** singular from jāti feminine > > **bhavo** singular from bhava masculine > > **upādānaṃ** singular from upādāna neuter > > **taṇhā** singular from taṇhā feminine > > **vedanā** singular from vedanā feminine > > **phasso** singular from phassa masculine > > **saḷāyatanaṃ** singular from saḷāyatana neuter > > **nāmarūpaṃ** singular from nāmarūpa neuter > > **viññāṇaṃ** singular from viññāṇa neuter > > **saṅkhārā** plural from saṅkhāra masculine > > **avijjā** singular from avijjā feminine The above seems to correlate with every translation I have read. Note: saḷāyatanaṃ may appear to be translated as plural but it appears singular because it includes 'six'. For example, all translations say: "*What is feeling [singular]?*" rather than "*What are feelings [plural]?*" > And what is feeling? Katamā ca, bhikkhave, vedanā? There are these six > classes of feeling. Chayime, bhikkhave, vedanākāyā— Feeling born of > contact through the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind. > cakkhusamphassajā vedanā, sotasamphassajā vedanā, ghānasamphassajā > vedanā, jivhāsamphassajā vedanā, kāyasamphassajā vedanā, > manosamphassajā vedanā. This is called feeling. Ayaṃ vuccati, > bhikkhave, vedanā. The saṅkhārā condition is described as follows: > And what are **saṅkhārā [plural]**? Katame ca, bhikkhave, saṅkhārā? > > There are three kinds of saṅkhārā. Tayome, bhikkhave, > saṅkhārā— body saṅkhāro [singular], speech saṅkhāro [singular] and mind saṅkhāro > [singular] kāyasaṅkhāro, vacīsaṅkhāro, cittasaṅkhāro. Why is the Pali word 'saṅkhārā' in Dependent Origination plural where all other words are singular?

Sn 2.1 has been translated as follows: > Ye ariyasaccāni vibhāvayanti, Gambhīrapaññena sudesitāni; Kiñcāpi te > honti bhusaṃ pamattā, Na te **bhavaṃ** **aṭṭhamam** ** href="https://suttacentral.net/define/%C4%81diyati">ādiyanti**; > Idampi saṅghe ratanaṃ paṇītaṃ, Etena saccena suvatthi hotu > > Who clearly comprehend these Noble Truths well-taught by him of wisdom > fathomless, however heedless be they afterwards upon an **eighth (aṭṭhamam)** > **existence (bhavaṃ)** they’ll not **seize (ādiyanti)**. Yea, in the Saṅgha is this glorious gem: By virtue of this truth, may blessing be! (Mills) > > Those who have seen clearly the noble truths well-taught by the one of > deep discernment — regardless of what [later] might make them heedless > — will come to no **eighth state of becoming**. This, too, is an > exquisite treasure in the Sangha. By this truth may there be > well-being. (Thanissaro) > > Those who realized the Noble Truths well taught by him who is profound > in wisdom (the Buddha), even though they may be exceedingly heedless, > they will not **take an eighth existence** (in the realm of sense > spheres). This precious jewel is the Sangha. By this (asseveration of > the) truth may there be happiness. (Piyadassi) What is meant here by an "eighth grasping, seizing or taking up (ādiyati) of becoming/existence (bhava)"?

It is commonly known that the Buddha decided that asceticism does not lead to enlightenment, but less common is the reason why given. From Ajahn Brahm's book Mindfulness, Bliss, and Beyond , it appears as though the Buddha abandoned asceticism because eating well was necessary to pursue the jhānas and the Middle Way: > once the Bodhisatta realized that jhāna was the way to enlightenment > (MN 36,31), he immediately recognized that it was impractical to > attain jhāna with an emaciated body so began eating well. Where in MN 36 do we find this reasoning? Is there general agreement in Buddhism that this is indeed why the Buddha decided to give up asceticism?

A translation of SN 12.2 says: > *And what is dependent co-arising? From ignorance as a requisite condition come fabrications. From fabrications as a requisite > condition comes consciousness. From consciousness as a requisite > condition comes name-&-form. From name-&-form as a requisite condition > come the six sense media. From the six sense media as a requisite > condition comes contact. From contact as a requisite condition comes > feeling. From feeling as a requisite condition comes craving. From > craving as a requisite condition comes clinging/sustenance. From > clinging/sustenance as a requisite condition comes becoming. From > becoming as a requisite condition comes birth. From birth as a > requisite condition, then aging & death, **sorrow, lamentation, pain, > distress & despair** come into play. Such is the origination of this > entire mass of stress & suffering.* The impression of the above text is - for sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress & despair to come into play - aging & death must occur. I have two questions: 1. If death must occur for sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress & despair to come into play; what is the cause for people having sorrow, grief & despair before death, i.e., in the present moment? 2. If death must occur for sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress & despair to come into play; is sorrow, grief & despair only experienced after death?

SN 12.66 says: > *The many diverse kinds of suffering that arise in the world headed by aging-and-death: this suffering has acquisition as its source, > acquisition as its origin; it is born and produced from acquisition. > When there is acquisition, aging-and-death comes to be; when there is > no acquisition, aging-and-death does not come to be.* Why does SN 12.66 say aging-and-death has acquisition (upadhi) as its source? Why doesn't SN 22.66 say aging-and-death has cancer or heart disease as its source?

Is it possible that a meditator uses jhana practice and dry insight together? I mean: not combined in the same meditation session, but clearly in separate, distinct meditation sessions. Both meditation practices have their own benefits (and disadvantages), so I wonder if it wouldn't be favorable to use the strengths of both.

In the Bible a complex saga of the human experience is elaborated in a multitude of ways, and these nuances make the text hard to crack in a linear reading. However, there exists a very illuminating chapter (Sermon on the Mount) that provides a very well articulated elaboration on what could be considered the core Christian ethics. It ultimately grounds the metaphysical landscape or at least informs many passages (both before and after it) to be more easily interpretted. I am interested in learning if there are any similar passages that could be pointed out in the Buddhist texts. My entirety of exposure to Buddhist source text currently is the Zen sutra on the lotus flower, and this question is open to any sect.

In this sutta (https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an/an04/an04.077.than.html) , it is explained that the power of Gotama Buddha as a sammasambuddha cannot or should not be conjecture about; the underlying mechanisms of kamma are not available to be investigated either. However, also in the suttas it is emphazised that the teachings can be tested by ourselves through practice and investigation, being that the 'ehipassiko' ("come and see") aspect of the Dhamma. How can we conciliate those aspects of the Dhamma? We have teachers and bhikkhus teachings about rebirth, kamma, abhijjas, the nature of Buddhas and arahants, the nature of reality, and so on, but never reaching consensus about those themes. Even within the same schools, the teachings of those topics varies from teacher to teacher. It seems to me that Buddhism, at least in those topics, becomes a religion as the many others existent. Are we supposed to follow blindly this part of the Dhamma? Thanks for your time!

I'm not sure sure if this is opinion based or not but my question is. is it fair to judge Vedehika, poorly (and does the sutta really do this). It seems like she was pushed to the breaking point (malicioulsly) and is the lesson here that she is not really as good a person as was previously reported? After this account the sutta seems to switch from this perspective to the actions expectation of a bhikkhu and not a lay person.

I read in a sutta a few days ago (I can't remember the exactly where) that the question of rebirth after parinibbana is not a valid one, because there was no one to be reborn. But if anatta is valid not just for arahants, but for all conditioned phenomena as well, does that mean that rebirth is also not applicable for non-arahants either? Thanks for your time!

(Before asking my question, I'd like to make clear that all of my previous knowledge comes from sources other than the suttas). Is the buddhist doctrine of kamma a superstitious explanation for what is happening in the present? How do the suttas explain diseases, malformations, intelectual handicaps and random misfortunes? Is there such a thing as random misfortunes for the Buddha (as exposed in the suttas)? Or can all of my present circumstances be explained and attributed to "my" past deeds? I ask this because I read in lots of places that some teachers explain diseases as consequences of our own deeds, and I not sure of how much of that come from the suttas themselves. Another question, somehow related to the last one: As far as I know, the Theravada doctrine is not a non-dualistic one, and the suttas explicitly say that all conditioned phenomena are dukkha. But for other schools, is there such a thing as "bad" and "good" external circumstances? For those non-dualistic schools: do they accept that everything is dukkha? Or do they say that our minds are the ones interpreting things as good and bad, and as such, good and bad kamma is just and illusion? Thanks in advance for your time!

After reading the answers to this question I understand that keeping the object of meditation same, Samatha leads to calm and tranquility of mind and Vipassana leads to insight into nature of reality. If I focus on the breath or if my object of meditation is bearth while meditation, what is the exact technique for both Samatha and Vipassana. Sorry, the answers to question does not mention the technique or what exactly to do. Also google search results are showing up magazine articles. References to suttas appreciated. Thanks.

Near the end of the Samaññaphala Sutta it says this: >"The king is incapacitated. Had he not killed his father — that righteous man, that righteous king — the dustless, stainless Dhamma eye would have arisen to him as he sat in this very seat." DN 2 https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/dn/dn.02.0.than.html Now in the English language to my knowledge when one uses the word "would" it means something definite. By my understanding it seems that the Buddha according to this sutta is saying that if King Ajatasattu had fulfilled certain **conditions** such as having not committed such an offense + coming to the Buddha and inquiring etc. as he did in this sutta **then** the "dustless, stainless Dhamma eye" would have **definitely** arisen. So this particular statement seems entirely deterministic unless I am misunderstanding or translation is wrong. Was the King already a faith follower or wisdom follower?

How is this possible besides if one simply doesn't mind if others are suffering? But if one truly doesn't mind whether others are suffering or not isn't that a lack of compassion? Is one supposed to let go of compassion regarding others? Even if there is nothing that one can do to help the other being, even if one is doing one's best, wouldn't the desire to end all suffering for all sentient beings still be present and therefore suffering still existing in one before that goal has been achieved? I don't see how it is possible for a being to be compassionate and free of suffering while still knowing that others are suffering. Is it supernatural? Does it transcend reason?

SN 12.51 says: > *Bhikkhus, if a person immersed in ignorance generates a meritorious volitional formation, consciousness fares on to the meritorious; if he > generates a demeritorious volitional formation, consciousness fares on > to the demeritorious; if he generates an imperturbable volitional > formation, consciousness fares on to the imperturbable. But when a > bhikkhu has abandoned ignorance and aroused true knowledge, then, with > the fading away of ignorance and the arising of true knowledge, he > does not generate a meritorious volitional formation, or a > demeritorious volitional formation, or an imperturbable volitional > formation. Since he does not generate or fashion volitional > formations, he does not cling to anything in the world. Not clinging, > he is not agitated. Not being agitated, he personally attains Nibbāna. > He understands: ‘Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, > what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this state of > being.’* Why are meritorious formations rooted in ignorance? Also, since MN 117 says the Noble Eighfold Path and its Two Noble Fruits are "kusala", are meritorious formations "wholesome" or "skilful" ("kusala"? Or is there a difference between the words "meritorious" ("puññā") and "skilful" ("kusala")? > *So there are twenty on the side of the skillful, and twenty on the side of the unskillful.* > > *Iti kho, bhikkhave, vīsati kusalapakkhā, vīsati akusalapakkhā—* > > *MN 117*

This question is related to this one (and its comments) I made before: https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/questions/30156/in-the-dependent-origination-formula-shouldnt-perception-precede-craving-inste According to the Khajjaniya Sutta, sañña is perception "because it perceives yellow... blue... red... white". So, it seems that it allows the mind to give a concept or label to whatever it's contacting and feeling. (https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn22/sn22.079.than.html) To label and to recognize "such as such", one has to process enough contextual information to know that any object is that object and not other object. In the gestalt psychological theory of processing of stimuli, one identifies phenomena not because the perception of a single trait but rather the perception of a set of characteristics in a context. In between those perceived features, one may find even subjective labels, such as "good", "bad", "better", "worst", "beautiful", "ugly", etc. The nature of such concepts is that their criterion for definition is not at face value, but defined by every individual person. Those labels are ambiguous until specified by the speaker. But despite their subjective nature, they're may be included in a person's definitions of an object and its features. As an example, one might think that in the definition of an X race is the concept of inferiority in Y activity of life, such as intelectual learning. Understood under this perspective, subjective qualities may fall under the definition of perception (at least as understood in modern psychology). Is this also valid for Buddhism? Or do they have their own specific category? What is the perspective on this point in the myriad of traditions and sects? What do the suttas say? What is your personal opinion? Thank you in beforehand for your time and patience!

By far I have came across only Ajahn Brahms book which gives detailed instructions on entering Jhnanas. If I google for any other instruction manual I get this link . I don't doubt Ajahn Brahm at all but I havent read any reviews or blogs or internet postings of anyone who has entered Jhnanas through the instruction set of AB. The link seems to be talking on similar lines but different language. Is there a certified, peer reviewed instruction manual to entering Jnanas? Can you provide any other instruction manual link preferably if you have experienced it.

And how about followers of other non-Theravadin Buddhisms? Why? If they cannot, what is the last stage of enlightenment that they are able to achieve? Please refer to sources in your answers.

As I understand, there is an acknowledgement of the expected lifespan within the respective deva worlds, though this differs among traditions. I'm curious if there's any textual reference to devas' mortality. That is to say, can a deva's lifespan be cut short? I suspect that an asura or human with supernormal power could kill a deva (I believe there is reference to this in the vinaya regarding possession by yakshas). Is there any scriptural evidence to back this up? Many thanks.

*Added: I am asking this because I am not sure if anything I observe would be considered "self" according to the Buddha. I don't have this problem with craving or suffering because I can observe/experience craving and suffering and it seems quite clear that they can be and are defined as such.* It seems to me I am unable to determine whether there is, isn't, what is or what isn't "self" because I don't know what aspect/s of reality the word "self" is defined as corresponding to. I am wondering if it is possible to describe what aspect/s of reality the word "self" is defined as corresponding to. It looks like the Buddha may have defined the aggregates as "not-self" so if there is a "self" (What is a "self"?) then according to the Buddha it's definitely not the aggregates. In my opinion this cannot simply be a "view for practicality" because then the Buddha would be a liar in that case.