Title. Five aggregates kind of thing, nature of conciousness, perception etc

What exactly is the anatomy of a Desire and why does it have such a potent effect on our psyche and life? Is it a ***thought*** of wanting something we don't have, but then we have so many thoughts about so many things? Is it a ***feeling*** of missing something or something being wrong in the present moment, but then we have so many other feelings? Is it a mental reaction, or ***perception*** of thought and feeling? Is it some mental energy illumined by ***consciousness***? Or is it will want? The Buddha went as far as saying, ***taṇhā*** ("craving, desire or attachment") is the cause of suffering. I want to understand what is this as a phenomenon?

Is suchness, tathata, as a concept always something in addition to phenomena? If not, when we talk about the suchness of phenomena we could mean what they are like, the qualitative experience of a taste e.g.. But if, conceptually, they are different, then no experience of taste amounts to its "true state" -- the meaning of suchness. I'm asking because I've seen it said that tathata *means* qualia. And, while I never agreed, I wasn't sure what's wrong with that. I suspect, today, that it's wrong because they are in fact opposites -- opposites that need to be harmonized

Together they refer to one's mental processes as a whole. Separately, what are they and how are they different?

The concept of self is important in social psychology: self-concept, self-esteem, self-control, self-awareness, etc. As a *science*, these concepts are measured under scientific methods, and there are interesting results. For example, a positive self-esteem does not mean people only have positive self-evaluations, but about balancing positive and negative thoughts. I think these results don't necessarily refute the central idea of Buddhism that clinging on the self concept will lead to sufferings, but on the other hand, Buddhism also advocates scientific methods to evaluate itself. As there are strong evidences that the self exists, I think it's better to say "there is self, but we shouldn't think about it to avoid sufferings" rather than say "the self is an illusion". - What is the Buddhist view on this?
FYI: • [Buddhism and psychology: Perception and the self – Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buddhism_and_psychology#Perception_and_the_self) • [Social psychology: Self-concept – Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_psychology#Self-concept) • [Mindfulness](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mindfulness) is used to develop self-knowledge • https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/q/5662/13525 • [What is the relation between measures, constructs and concepts?](https://psychology.stackexchange.com/q/9610/12937)

For example, in this answer , we find Buddhists insisting that the mind is not a "byproduct" of the brain, i.e. the mind does not arise neurologically in the brain. By neurology, I mean that according to that view, the mind arises by the electrical and chemical interactions happening in neuron cells of the physical brain. I have also seen Ajahn Brahm stating in a video that even a person with dementia would have a moment of clarity of mind, just before death, proving that the mind is not neurologically originated. My understanding is that Buddhists have this view, because without it, it does not seem sensible that the mind stream can be reborn into another life. Is this right? That's my first question. This answer is interesting: > Consciousness (viññana) and Materiality (rūpa) are related as are > magnetism and electricity. Their relationship is reciprocal, each > conditioning the other. They are dependently originated, i.e. neither > exists independently. To me, it does not matter if the mind arose neurologically in the physical brain or not. My analogy is that software or data is composed of the bits of 1s and 0s on the physical media of a computer, for example, harddisk and RAM. So, it is electronically and chemically originated. However, software can be copied or transferred to other computers or other physical media over networks. So, while software depends on physical media, this does not impede it from moving to other physical media. So, my second question is, does it really matter (in terms of holding the Right View ) if the mind is neurologically originated or not? I think if the mind is neurologically originated, it does not matter and does not impede the notion of rebirth or continuity of the mind stream, just like in the case of software.

**Dear friends**, looking for parallels between the practice of Tonglen , and the Husserlian notion of Intersubjectivity , I have come upon this research paper by Natalie Depraz, Phd. Quoting from the abstract : > It is well-known that Husserl’s analysis of intersubjectivity is > primarily based on empathy. Now, such an experience of empathy is > described in Husserl as involving the peculiar spatiality of our lived > body, a temporal pairing of both lived bodies and a specific > imaginative transfer of one’s psychic states into those of the other. > I would like to confront such a multilayered experience of the other > with the way some Buddhist teachings (which first appeared in India > and were then transmitted to Tibet) present the experience of > compassion within what is called the Mahayana tradition. Indeed, the > “tonglen” praxis (as Tibetans call it), which is described very > concretely in such a framework, echoes in many ways the Husserlian > empathetic experience as far as the bodily rooting, the synchronizing > timing are concerned and above all as far as the way imagination is > taken into account. By comparing both praxis and analysis with regard > to lived space, time and imagination, we will be able to evaluate > their affinities, their differences and finally how they may enlight > and even generate each other. I would welcome with the utmost gratitude your enlightening comments, and reference to relevant material. **Thank you** for having taken the time and effort to read this.

It was said in a book by my spiritual master that 'breaking unloyalty to one's spiritual master is worse than breaking a kapala', of which I deduce that breaking a kapala is a really bad sign. Is there any root text explaining what is particularly bad about breaking a kapala and what is the meaning of it?

I was once again challenged by my scientific friends: who say that all mind phenomena is just chemical reaction! My question is, how does Buddhist philosophy view this question? I'm leaning towards my science friends' view, after reading _A Manual of the Excellent Man_, where the seven aspects of perception on materiality are considered to be the combination of natural elements. If so how does a chemical overpower another, and is the transcendental self also chemical / elements? Because if it were not, then we could assume spiritual forces were active in creation, etc.!

I have seen in answers on this site (about consciousness in connection with rebirth) that Theravada adhere to a phenomenological perspective on consciousness. Can anyone explain for me what it means to have a phenomenological perspective? And which schools does not have this perspective?

I can see how one can develop, through one's practice, a very high degree of confidence in the truth of emptiness through inferring from the conditioned nature of phenomena, their impermanence, their dependence on a perceiving consciousness, and on the need for memory and intelligence in order to recognize them as existent, but is it possible to ever be 100% certain? Who's to say the Higgs Boson isn't the fundamental, truly existent building block of matter that can never be further reduced, even if quantum physics tells us it's in superposition when not interacting with an observer?