I have been practicing what I believe is insight meditation for over 5 or 6 years now in the Mahasi tradition but still very frequently I feel like I'm not doing it right or something. I suppose I thought that I would see some kind of change or have some insights but nothing much has changed and I can't say I've had any insights into the true nature of reality which is so often emphasised and mentioned. I've started to do body scans but I'm unsure if I'm doing it right. I sit for a while and notice the breath then I start at the top of my head and go down the body part by part ie crown of head, back of head, forehead, eyes, nose, lips, chin, neck etc. But I have difficulty with this. I'm unsure how to focus on a body part apart from trying to see it in my mind. I don't feel anything anywhere except for the air going through the nasal passages, sometimes the eyes flutter a bit, the abdomen rises and falls and the hands sometimes tingle or pulse. Everywhere else feels completely dead. Maybe I'm completely out of touch with my body and its sensations. I know they must be there but why can I not focus on them? Also sometimes I'll start at the head and then I realise I have wandered off for so long that the mediation is nearly over so I cannot even manage to scan the body at all! Please don't tell me to read the scriptures or find a teacher. The scriptures bore me. I'm not a religious person. They are just so repetitive and convoluted that I don't find them helpful. They send me to sleep, and trying to find a teacher is impossible. I have attended Sanghas regularly on occasions and nothing ever comes out of it. I don't know how to approach people and say can you please be my teacher. The people at the Sanghas didn't seem to be open to having students.

It is Tibetan mantra. In which traditon Om Ma Ni Pad Me Hum mantra is used Mahayana or Thervada? Or it is used in all three traditions, since this is Buddhism teaching?

I read the following article about the fullness of emptiness and this statement stuck out to me: > ...when we look at a sheet of paper, the sheet of paper is part of our > perception. Your mind is in here and mine is also, so we can say that > everything is in here in this sheet of paper. Now, the question is: prior to my perception of the paper, was it the same sheet of paper? Based on the article, my answer would be no. I would expound on that with the following thoughts: - prior to my perception of it, a paper exists that does not have my perception of it as an aggregate, **paper #1** - after my perception of the paper, a new paper came to exist consisting of all of the aggregates of **paper #1** plus my own perception, resulting in **paper #2** Conclusion: there are two distinct, co-existing pieces of paper. Thoughts?

There are the six types of consciousness (*viññāṇa*) based on MN 38 , namely those related to the six sense media: eye, ear, nose, tongue, touch or mind. In MN 49 , there was a "consciousness without surface" (*viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ*), which turned out to be a mistranslation, according to the answers of this question . The sutta was talking about Nibbana. So, are there any other types of consciousness (*viññāṇa*) in Theravada outside the six sense media consciousnesses? What about rebirth linking consciousness? Is that a type of consciousness outside the six sense media? I know in Mahayana, there are still two more types of consciousness according to this Wikipedia page . But this question is asking more from the Theravada perspective (including Abhidhamma).

Here's what I'm given to understand: The Abhidhamma manual classifies all possible mental states of a human being into - various different kinds of Chittas and Chetasikas. Here's what I want to know: - Are the mental states of (what is generally considered to be a) disorder, like say - Bipolar disorder, Autism etc. also considered and classified in this text? - Is there a way out of it? Is there anyway for someone who wants to help those in deeper suffering because of this. Meditation, medication, perspective, world view etc.

The first Precept is to abstain from Killing a "living being". Is there a consistent definition of Living Being that we should not kill to avoid violating the first Precept? I have heard of a definition such as a Living Being means they have the Five Aggregates, so that Plants / Germs do not count as they do not have all Five and cannot be reincarnated into.... etc. But I don't know if this definition is widely accepted in either Theravada or Mahayana. If this definition is accepted, how do we know what beings do not have all Five Aggregates? If not, is there any other definitions that we can use? Would also want to know if Clams, Oysters, Corals...etc... are considered as having all of the Five Aggregates too. Five Aggregates: 1. form (or matter or body) (rupa), 2. sensations (or feelings, received from form) (vedana), 3. perceptions (samjna), 4. mental activity or formations (sankhara), and 5. consciousness (vijnana)

Does Viññāṇa generate Nāmarūpa in the sense that would make "uploading concsciousness" to a computer impossible? I was reading this question on philosophy.stack I'd suspect that it's impossible to *make sense* of momentary rebirth / causal continuity in terms of computer data. Wouldn't every Buddhist say that pots and trees are mental constructions, so that, even if granted concrete reality, as in the Sarvastavadin school, they don't exist from moment to moment? A chariot's axle, for them, does not generate visual consciousness, only colour and shape do that. And so the same for computers. But should the Buddhist claim it's not merely opaque but impossible, especially due to mind-body dualism? Does rebirth consciousness actually **form** the new body (and mind), in the 12 links of dependent origination? Because if it does, unless I've misunderstood 'consciousness', perhaps due to its coupling with 'rebirth', I don't see how anyone can claim that there is genuine continuity. As surely my consciousness does not **form** the physical body of a computer: it's already been designed etc..

Not only as a reminder today, on Māgha Pūjā, it is possible of interest to know more about "Buddhist" secound large Pūjā and it would be interesting to get known different traditional customs (of course not that what is found on wiki, which has "real" info) and one or another might share "first hand" information around it, in Sangha spheres. What are the customs, their reasons, their ways of putting them into deeds? May all use the lasting hours for their long time benefit and cleaning!

Recently, Bhikkhu Sujato wrote: > It is no coincidence that these elaborate texts are often addressed to > the brahmins, who were the self-proclaimed spiritual leaders of the > time. The brahmins were the custodians of the most sophisticated texts > in ancient India up to this time, the Vedic literature. It seems that > one aim of the Dīgha was to impress such learned men. > >The Long Discourses: Dhamma as literature and compilation There also this introduction on _Access to Insight_ (which cites Bhikkhu Bodhi and Joy Manné): > The "Long" Discourses (Pali digha = "long") consists of 34 suttas, > including the longest ones in the Canon. The subject matter of these > suttas ranges widely, from colorful folkloric accounts of the beings > inhabiting the deva worlds (DN 20) to down-to-earth practical > meditation instructions (DN 22), and everything in between. Recent > scholarship suggests that a distinguishing trait of the Digha Nikaya > may be that it was "intended for the purpose of propaganda, to attract > converts to the new religion."1 > > 1. Bhikkhu Bodhi, Connected Discourses of the Buddha (Somerville, Mass.: Wisdom Publications, 2000), p.31, referring to Joy Manné's > "Categories of Sutta in the Pali Nikayas and Their Implications for > Our Appreciation of the Buddhist Teaching and Literature," Journal of > the Pali Text Society 15 (1990): 29-87. > >Sutta Pitaka The Basket of Suttas Is there evidence (such as contradictions with other suttas) suggesting the Buddha did not speak the Digha Nikaya? In there any evidence in the suttas where the Buddha said he would teach a different modified Dhamma ("propaganda") merely for the purpose of converting Brahmins & other outsiders? Is there any evidence in the suttas showing the Buddha was "flexible" in his teaching of Dhamma? Or do the suttas show the Buddha wished his teachings to remain consistent & clearly representative of what he taught?

The above mentioned technical terms are respectively translated as Craving for Becoming (something) & Craving for Non-Becoming/Getting Rid Off. Above said, how do we know that we're in Craving for Becoming (or not) whenever we're cultivating good? One of the limbs of the N8P, that is, 'bhavana', is about active cultivation. Where is the difference between the two? Similarly, if we do virtuous acts and reflect on those acts regularly, the perception of a 'virtuous person' increases as well, doesn't it? This too, then, is Bhava Tanha? Now with Vibhava Tanha: Suppose I am overweight and must lose weight immeditately; is the 'getting rid' of my body fat then considered vibhava tanha and at the same time 'bhava tanha' (becoming a skinny person)? Finally, when do we exactly know whether something is bhava tanha or kusala chanda? Is it primarily our motivation, i.e., in this case, for whom we're losing weight/what motivation causes us to lose weight, or is it something that we can't avoid at all, since 'identity birth(s)' ('I am this', 'I am not this') exists in everyone except in a fully enlightened being.

Is a Dhamma follower always a stream entrant? According to MN 70 : > “What kind of person is a Dhamma-follower? Here some person does not > contact with the body and abide in those liberations that are peaceful > and immaterial, transcending forms, and his taints are not yet > destroyed by his seeing with wisdom, **but those teachings proclaimed by > the Tathāgata are accepted by him after reflecting on them > sufficiently with wisdom. Furthermore, he has these qualities: the > faith faculty, the energy faculty, the mindfulness faculty, the > concentration faculty, and the wisdom faculty. This kind of person is > called a Dhamma-follower.** I say of such a bhikkhu that he still has > work to do with diligence. Why is that? Because when that venerable > one…into homelessness. Seeing this fruit of diligence for such a > bhikkhu, I say that he still has work to do with diligence.

What does craving feel like as a set of sensations (body and mind)? I'm interested the recognition of craving as it occurs in that moment and how other people's lived experience accords with my own. Also, if there are very different forms of craving that present in entirely different ways. Many Thanks

EDIT: I've changed this question from SN 22.56 to SN 22.57, but the sutta content related to my question is very similar. And I've added a new question. The term "form" in SN 22.57 below, seems to refer to the physical body. Cessation of form is "*rūpanirodha*". And the "seven bases" from the Thanissaro translation is a bit different from the Sujato and Bodhi translations which call it the "seven cases". Question 1: What does cessation of form through the noble eightfold path mean? Does it mean that physical rebirth is ended through the practice of the noble eightfold path? What else could it mean? Question 2: I guess it can be argued that the "cessation of form" (through noble eightfold path) and "escape from form" (through abandonment of passion and desire for form) are the same thing. But are these two the same or different? If they are the same, then why are they two different bases of the seven bases? From SN 22.57 (trans. Thanissaro): > "And how is a monk skilled in seven bases? There is the case where a > monk discerns form, the origination of form, the cessation of form, > the path of practice leading to the cessation of form. He discerns the > allure of form, the drawback of form, and the escape from form. > > "And what is form? The four great existents [the earth property, the > liquid property, the fire property, & the wind property] and the form > derived from them: this is called form. From the origination of > nutriment comes the origination of form. > > From the cessation of nutriment comes the cessation of form. And just > this **noble eightfold path is the path of practice leading to the > cessation of form**, i.e., right view, right resolve, right speech, > right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right > concentration. > > The fact that pleasure & happiness arises in dependence on form: that > is the allure of form. The fact that form is inconstant, stressful, > subject to change: that is the drawback of form. The subduing of > desire & passion for form, **the abandoning of desire & passion for > form: that is the escape from form.** > > "For any brahmans or contemplatives who by directly knowing form in > this way, directly knowing the origination of form in this way, > directly knowing the cessation of form in this way, directly knowing > the path of practice leading to the cessation of form in this way, > directly knowing the allure of form in this way, directly knowing the > drawback of form in this way, directly knowing the escape from form in > this way, are practicing for disenchantment — dispassion — cessation > with regard to form, they are practicing rightly. Those who are > practicing rightly are firmly based in this doctrine & discipline. Translated by Bhikkhu Sujato here : > And how is a mendicant skilled in seven cases? It’s when a mendicant > understands form, its origin, its cessation, and the practice that > leads to its cessation. They understand form’s gratification, > drawback, and escape. They understand feeling … perception … choices … > consciousness, its origin, its cessation, and the practice that leads > to its cessation. They understand consciousness’s gratification, > drawback, and escape. > > And what is form? The four primary elements, and form derived from the > four primary elements. This is called form. Form originates from food. > When food ceases, form ceases. **The practice that leads to the > cessation of form is simply this noble eightfold path**, that is: right > view, right thought, right speech, right action, right livelihood, > right effort, right mindfulness, and right immersion. > > The pleasure and happiness that arise from form: this is its > gratification. That form is impermanent, suffering, and perishable: > this is its drawback. **Removing and giving up desire and greed for > form: this is its escape.** > > Those ascetics and brahmins who have directly known form in this > way—and its origin, its cessation, and the practice that leads to its > cessation; its gratification, drawback, and escape—and are practicing > for disillusionment, dispassion, and cessation regarding form: they > are practicing well. Those who practice well have a firm footing in > this teaching and training.

Are there references that the Buddha taught such as metta-meditation to householders (wordlings, without complete Sila), giving ground for hypocritical practice, agree with such, in manners of: "There is the case where a householder..."? Didn't he not focused on getting right view and Silas first? Was modern householder-metta-meditation ever taught, even trained by the elders, such as doing it inbetween business as usual? *[Note: this is not given for trade, exchange, stacks and to maintain houses but for liberation and with non-hypocratical metta: may all beings give causes to find there way out for themselves with ease.]*

According to MN 60 and other suttas, believing in karma and afterlife is right view and believing that there is no karma and afterlife is unskillful and a wrong view because there is actually karma and next world. > "Now, householders, of those contemplatives & brahmans who hold this doctrine, hold this view — 'There is nothing given, nothing offered, nothing sacrificed. There is no fruit or result of good or bad actions. There is no this world, no next world, no mother, no father, no spontaneously reborn beings; no brahmans or contemplatives who, faring rightly and practicing rightly, proclaim this world and the next after having directly known and realized it for themselves' — it can be expected that, shunning these three skillful activities — good bodily conduct, good verbal conduct, good mental conduct — they will adopt & practice these three unskillful activities: bad bodily conduct, bad verbal conduct, bad mental conduct. Why is that? Because those venerable contemplatives & brahmans do not see, in unskillful activities, the drawbacks, the degradation, and the defilement; nor in skillful activities the rewards of renunciation, resembling cleansing. >"Because there actually is the next world, the view of one who thinks, 'There is no next world' is his wrong view. Because there actually is the next world, when he is resolved that 'There is no next world,' that is his wrong resolve. Because there actually is the next world, when he speaks the statement, 'There is no next world,' that is his wrong speech. Because there actually is the next world, when he says that 'There is no next world,' he makes himself an opponent to those arahants who know the next world. Because there actually is the next world, when he persuades another that 'There is no next world,' that is persuasion in what is not true Dhamma. And in that persuasion in what is not true Dhamma, he exalts himself and disparages others. Whatever good habituation he previously had is abandoned, while bad habituation is manifested. And this wrong view, wrong resolve, wrong speech, opposition to the arahants, persuasion in what is not true Dhamma, exaltation of self, & disparagement of others: These many evil, unskillful activities come into play, in dependence on wrong view. This actually make sense. For example, if someone tell you that your mother is dead because he actually saw your mother die then he is telling the truth but if you think that your mother is still alive and not dead then that is a wrong view because your mother is actually dead. In the same way, the Buddha has actually seen how karma works. It is mentioned in MN 36 and some other suttas. >"When the mind was thus concentrated, purified, bright, unblemished, rid of defilement, pliant, malleable, steady, & attained to imperturbability, I directed it to the knowledge of the passing away & reappearance of beings. I saw — by means of the divine eye, purified & surpassing the human — beings passing away & re-appearing, and I discerned how they are inferior & superior, beautiful & ugly, fortunate & unfortunate in accordance with their kamma: 'These beings — who were endowed with bad conduct of body, speech, & mind, who reviled the noble ones, held wrong views and undertook actions under the influence of wrong views — with the break-up of the body, after death, have re-appeared in the plane of deprivation, the bad destination, the lower realms, in hell. But these beings — who were endowed with good conduct of body, speech & mind, who did not revile the noble ones, who held right views and undertook actions under the influence of right views — with the break-up of the body, after death, have re-appeared in the good destinations, in the heavenly world.' Thus — by means of the divine eye, purified & surpassing the human — I saw beings passing away & re-appearing, and I discerned how they are inferior & superior, beautiful & ugly, fortunate & unfortunate in accordance with their kamma. So **my questions is why don't some buddhists believe in karma and rebirth**? The Kalama Sutta does tell us to only believe what we can experience ourself but even then you cannot deny karma and rebirth because it is possible to know them through the fourth jhana. So **why don't they just have the view "Karma and rebirth could be real" instead of denying them completely?** **Is it also kind of a counterfeit dharma if someone says that rebirth and karma are metaphorical and not real?**

The following quotes talk about consciousness. Through relishing, intending or having underlying tendencies, consciousness would grow, increase, mature, land, establish. **What does growth, increase, maturing, landing and establishing of consciousness mean in this case?** **Are these simply different ways of talking about craving and clinging?** Or is there another interpretation? When it comes to relishing, it sounds like the craving and clinging of sensual pleasures (*kama*) based on sensations that are cognized (based on SN 22.79's statement that consciousness is that which cognizes). When it comes to intending, it sounds like the craving and clinging of becoming (*bhava*) based on mental ideas that are cognized (based on SN 22.79's statement that consciousness is that which cognizes). From SN 22.53 : > As long as consciousness remains, it would remain involved with form, > supported by form, founded on form. And with a sprinkle of relishing, > it would grow, increase, and mature. > *Rūpupayaṃ vā, bhikkhave, viññāṇaṃ > tiṭṭhamānaṃ tiṭṭheyya, rūpārammaṇaṃ rūpappatiṭṭhaṃ nandūpasecanaṃ > vuddhiṃ virūḷhiṃ vepullaṃ āpajjeyya.* And the same applies to other aggregates apart from form. From SN 12.38 : > “Mendicants, what you intend or plan, and what you have underlying > tendencies for become a support for the continuation of consciousness. > *“Yañca, bhikkhave, ceteti yañca pakappeti yañca anuseti, ārammaṇametaṃ > hoti viññāṇassa ṭhitiyā.* > > When this support exists, consciousness becomes established. > *Ārammaṇe > sati patiṭṭhā viññāṇassa hoti.* > > When consciousness is established and grows, there is rebirth into a > new state of existence in the future. > *Tasmiṃ patiṭṭhite viññāṇe > virūḷhe āyatiṃ punabbhavābhinibbatti hoti.* As an additional reference from SN 22.79 : > “And why, bhikkhus, do you call it consciousness? ‘It cognizes, ’ > bhikkhus, therefore it is called consciousness. And what does it > cognize? It cognizes sour, it cognizes bitter, it cognizes pungent, it > cognizes sweet, it cognizes sharp, it cognizes mild, it cognizes > salty, it cognizes bland. ‘It cognizes,’ bhikkhus, therefore it is > called consciousness.

I believe I have read within the Dalai Lama's works that there exists (at least) two kinds of compassion meditation: - Generating the four abodes within oneself, in a more concentrative and affective way (*metta bhavana*). - Analyzing compassion through logical discernment, having compassion as meditative object. I noticed my capacity to be compassionate with analysis seems very limited. The Dalai Lama suggests to focus on *feeling* after using reasons to generate compassion. **Is it possible that my mind functions more with feeling, and that analysis doesn't generate as much compassion in myself? What is the best course of action to generate compassion?**

In SN 12.17, it is said: > *Well now, good Gotama, is suffering caused by oneself?* > > *No indeed, Kassapa," said the Blessed One.* > > *Well then, good Gotama, is one's suffering caused by another?* > > *No indeed, Kassapa.* > > *Well then, good Gotama, is suffering caused by both oneself and another?* > > *No indeed, Kassapa.* > > *'He who performs the act also experiences [the result]' — what you, Kassapa, first called 'suffering caused by oneself' — this amounts to > the Eternalist theory.* > > *'One person performs the act, another experiences,' — which to the person affected seems like "suffering caused by another" — this > amounts to the Annihilationist theory.* Alternate translation: >*Kassapa, if one thinks, ‘The one who acts is the same as the one who > experiences the result,’ then one asserts with reference to one > existing from the beginning: ‘Suffering is created by oneself.’ When > one asserts thus, this amounts to eternalism. But, Kassapa, if one > thinks, ‘The one who acts is one, the one who experiences the result > is another,’ then one asserts with reference to one stricken by > feeling: ‘Suffering is created by another.’ When one asserts thus, > this amounts to annihilationism. Without veering towards either of > these extremes, the Tathagata teaches the Dhamma by the middle: ‘With > ignorance as condition, formations come to be; with > volitional formations as condition, consciousness…. Such is the origin > of this whole mass of suffering. But with the remainderless > fading away and cessation of ignorance comes cessation of volitional > formations; with the cessation of formations, cessation of > consciousness…. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of > suffering.*’ Why are 'eternalism' & 'annihilationism' mentioned in SN 12.17 when SN 12.17 does not appear to be directly about reincarnation or about the denial of reincarnation?

AN 10.61 says: > Thus not associating with good persons, becoming full, fills up not > hearing the good Dhamma. Not hearing the good Dhamma, becoming full, > fills up lack of faith. Lack of faith, becoming full, fills up > **careless attention (ayonisomanasikāro)**. Careless attention, becoming full, fills up lack > of mindfulness and clear comprehension. Lack of mindfulness and clear > comprehension, becoming full, fills up non-restraint of the sense > faculties. Non-restraint of the sense faculties, becoming full, fills > up the three kinds of misconduct. > >AN 10.61 Since careless or improper attention (ayonisomanasikāro) results in non-restraint of the sense faculties, it appears this ayonisomanasikāro arises before sense contact in Dependent Origination. Is this true? If the above is true, where do we think careless or improper attention (ayonisomanasikāro) should be placed within the standard teaching of the twelve conditions of Dependent Origination?

The Sabba Sutta (SN 35.23) (trans. Thanissaro) states: > The Blessed One said, "What is the All? Simply the eye & forms, ear & > sounds, nose & aromas, tongue & flavors, body & tactile sensations, > intellect & ideas. This, monks, is called the All. Anyone who > would say, 'Repudiating this All, I will describe another,' if > questioned on what exactly might be the grounds for his statement, > would be unable to explain, and furthermore, would be put to grief. > Why? Because it lies beyond range." The commentary on this sutta by Thanissaro Bhikkhu states: > Furthermore, the following discourse (SN 35.24 ) says that the "All" is > to be abandoned. At no point does the Canon say that nibbana is to be > abandoned. Nibbana follows on cessation (*nirodha*), which is to be > realized. Once nibbana is realized, there are no further tasks to be > done. > > Thus it seems more this discourse's discussion of "All" is meant to > limit the use of the word "all" throughout the Buddha's teachings to > the six sense spheres and their objects. As the following discourse > shows, this would also include the consciousness, contact, and > feelings connected with the sense spheres and their objects. Nibbana > would lie outside of the word, "all." This would fit in with another > point made several times in the Canon: that dispassion is the highest > of all dhammas (Iti 90 ), while the arahant has gone beyond even > dispassion (Sn 4.6 ; Sn 4.10 ). > > This raises the question, if the word "all" does not include nibbana, > does that mean that one may infer from the statement, "all phenomena > are not-self" that nibbana is self? The answer is no. As AN 4.174 > states, to even ask if there is anything remaining or not remaining > (or both, or neither) after the cessation of the six sense spheres is > to differentiate what is by nature undifferentiated (or to objectify > the unobjectified — see the Introduction to MN 18 ). The range of > differentiation goes only as far as the "All." Perceptions of self or > not-self, which would count as differentiation, would not apply beyond > the "All." When the cessation of the "All" is experienced, all > differentiation is allayed. On the other hand, Bhikkhu Bodhi wrote in the book The Connected Discourses of the Buddha Vol II : > On first consideration, it would seem that the six internal and > external sense bases should be understood simply as the six sense > faculties and their objects, with the term *āyatana*, base, having the > sense of origin or source. Though many suttas lend support to this > supposition, the Theravada exegetical tradition, beginning already > from the Abhidhamma period, understands the six pairs of bases as a > complete scheme of classification capable of accommodating all the > factors of existence mentioned in the Nikayas. This conception of the > six bases probably originated from the Sabba Sutta (35:23) , in which > the Buddha says that the six pairs of bases are "the all" apart from > which nothing at all exists. To make the six bases capable of > literally incorporating everything, the Vibhanga of the Abhidhamma > Pitaka defines the mind base (*manāyatana*) as including all classes > of consciousness, and the mental phenomena base (*dhammāyatana*) as > including the other three mental aggregates, subtle nonsensuous types > of form, and even the unconditioned element, Nibbāna (see Vibh 70-73). So, Thanissaro Bhikkhu says that Nibbana is not included in The All. Bhikkhu Bodhi says Nibbana is included in The All. Who is right? And why? What is also interesting is that Bhikkhu Bodhi's interpretation would put all types of consciousness within the classification of the six sense bases.