What is world (*loka*) in the context of SN 12.44 ? Why is it called "world"? Is it related to "The All" (SN 35.23 )? > “And what, bhikkhus, is the origin of the world? In dependence on the > eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is > contact. With contact as condition, feeling comes to be; with feeling > as condition, craving; with craving as condition, clinging; with > clinging as condition, existence; with existence as condition, birth; > with birth as condition, aging-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, > displeasure, and despair come to be. This, bhikkhus, is the origin of > the world. > > “In dependence on the ear and sounds … In dependence on the nose and > odours … In dependence on the tongue and tastes … In dependence on the > body and tactile objects … In dependence on the mind and mental > phenomena, mind-consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is > contact. With contact as condition, feeling comes to be; with feeling > as condition, craving; with craving as condition, clinging … existence > … birth; with birth as condition, aging-and-death, sorrow, > lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair come to be. This, > bhikkhus, is the origin of the world. > > “And what, bhikkhus, is the passing away of the world? In dependence > on the eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises. The meeting of the > three is contact. With contact as condition, feeling comes to be; with > feeling as condition, craving. But with the remainderless fading away > and cessation of that same craving comes cessation of clinging; with > the cessation of clinging, cessation of existence; with the cessation > of existence, cessation of birth; with the cessation of birth, > aging-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair > cease. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering. This, > bhikkhus, is the passing away of the world. > > “In dependence on the ear and sounds … … In dependence on the mind and > mental phenomena, mind-consciousness arises. The meeting of the three > is contact. With contact as condition, feeling comes to be; with > feeling as condition, craving. But with the remainderless fading away > and cessation of that same craving comes cessation of clinging … > cessation of existence … cessation of birth; with the cessation of > birth, aging-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and > despair cease. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering. > This, bhikkhus, is the passing away of the world.”

> According to the Brahmajala Sutta, Ajita propounded Ucchedavada (the > Doctrine of Annihilation after death) and Tam-Jivam-tam-sariram-vada > (the doctrine of identity of the soul and body), which denied the > separate existence of an eternal soul. Annihilationism is usually thought of as one extreme, which assumes an atman. But if atman is permanent, I don't easily see the error here. 1. Why is it a self view? 2. Can you support Ucchedavada as well as anatman? 3. If not why not? if it's because Ucchedavada explicitly posits a self, what happens when you remove that from the teaching, and is it still Ucchedavada?

It is well known that there are periodic crises in Buddhism, usually - it seems - involving sexual misconduct. I also know that e.g. Vasubandhu claimed that aryans - even if they could still have sexual desire - were incapable of sexual misconduct. Does that mean that everyone involved in these crises are complete fakes or have retrogressed? Quite famously, an important Tibetan llama was even convicted of child rape : can anyone defend the claim any a "tulku" of this sort is a Buddha behind bars?

I try to do abit of chanting everyday, and I have tingling feelings in my upper body (spine/arms) the moment I begin chanting starting with Namo Tassa, Itipiso, homage to Dhamma, homage to Sangha, when I chant other suttas like bojjhana sutta I get the tingling feeling too. However when I do reading of the suttas, I do not get the tingling feeling. I'd like to ask if it happens to everyone who does chanting, and what is the cause for this tingling feeling.

I just started Buddhism, and I made a mistake. I forgot about my Buddha statue I just got, and I ate a 2 marijuana brownies in front of the statue. How bad is that? I’m going to not take any more marijuana until the same day I disrespected the Buddha. Am I a bad person for that mistake?

Is it plausible or possible in Buddhist thought for a being to experience nirvana, enlightenment, without adhering to Buddhist thoughts or viewpoints? It it possible for people to receive true dharma from a not-Buddhist framework? From my standpoint, there are many people in the world from various traditions who practice deep meditation and live virtuous lives. It seems reasonable to me that in their practices they, too, come into the presence of the deepest grounds of being, and achieve profound realizations and transformations. Yet, if they are not Buddhist, they may not report back things like emptiness of self and all phenomenon, or reincarnation. They might instead discuss the soul, the self, God, for example. Hence my questions. In some Mahamudra texts, I have read things like “one must recognize the emptiness of the mind” in order to get to the most advanced levels. Is that really so? What happens if we get to the deepest levels in meditation, and we decide that there is not emptiness of the mind? I would imagine the answers are different for different schools of Buddhism. I am interested in specific schools’ thoughts, and general Buddhist perspective as a whole.

What are the main differences between the Rinzai and Soto Zen schools? Is it right that koans are only used in one of the schools? Also are there other Zen schools and if so what distinguishes those schools from the other Zen schools?

How is Buddhism structured? All I really know if you have lay people, priests, monks, and in some places masters or grand masters (I don't know if these are the same), and there are various different variants of the religion, each with their own clergy etc.. So, by analogy, Britain has the arch bishop of Canterbury , and he's the principle "head of the Church" of England. What equivalent formal positions exist in Japanese Buddhism? Google wasn't much help! All I found out was that e.g. Soto zen has two principle temples, Eihei-ji and Sōji-ji. Do they have heads? Soto's - democratic - head is the "Shūmusōchō"; where can I read about this position? Are the other subsets of Buddhism structured similarly?

In the literature we generally read that the Koliya clan, a neighbouring clan of the Sakyans, had two capitals - Devadaha and Ramagama. Moreover, the Buddha's mother Mayadevi and foster mother Mahapajapati Gautami were Koliyan ladies from Devadaha. But the following few facts cast doubt on whether Devadaha was actually a Koliyan town and whether the Buddha's maternal relatives were actually Koliyans. 1. We read that the Sakyans and the Koliyans resided on the opposite sides of the river Rohini and they often quarelled with each other over the water of that river. Now, the Sakyan capital Kapilavatthu is on the west side of the Rohini. In keeping with this, the Koliyan capital Ramagama is on the east side of the river. In contrast, Devadaha is on the west side of the Rohini. 2. In her Apadana, Gautami says that she was born in Devadaha and her father was Anjana Sakya. 3. In the opening of the Devadaha Sutta (MN 101), Devadaha is mentioned as a Sakyan town. These facts strongly point to the possibility that only Ramagama was the capital of the Koliyans. Devadaha was actually a Sakyan town and the Buddha's maternal relatives were also Sakyans. There are few additional points that strengthen this conclusion: 1. Since the Sakyans and the Koliyans were opponents, it is unlikely that they would make marrital relationship with each other. 2. We know from Bidudabha's story that the Sakyans were so proud about their nobility that they were unwilling to make relationship even with the mighty king of Kosala, Pasenadi. So how could they make relationship with the small clan Koliya? 3. The Koliyans, being a small clan like the Sakyans, were unlikely to have two capitals. Is my conclusion correct? If so, I would like to know how the ideas that the Buddha's maternal relatives were Koliyans from Devadaha entered the literature. Are there any evidence in support of this in the Pali canon or commentaries?

Does the relinquishing of views prohibit belief in the permanence of buddha nature? > I prostrate to Gautama, who, out of loving compassion, taught the > excellent Dharma in order to relinquish all views. The dedication to Nagarjuna'a MMK > In the opening of the Buddha nature book of Sbobogenzo, Dogen quotes > the following passage from the Nirvana Sutra: — H > Qnai no sbujo wa > kotogotoku bussbdoyusu; Nyorai v>ajdjuniibite benyaku arukoto natbi), > “All sentient beings without exception have the Buddha nature: > Tatbdgata (Buddha) is permanent with no change at all.”8 This well > expresses the fundamental standpoint of Mahayana Buddhism. In the > passage two important themes are emphasized: “All sentient beings have > the Buddha nature,” and “Tathagata abides forever without change.” > These two themes are inseparable from one another. Against this > traditional reading, Dogen dares to read as follows... Masao Abe, Dogen on Buddha Nature.

**Let's go through the logic first. The following statements are suppositions that must be chronologically accepted.** 1) Matter is neither created nor destroyed. 2) Matter is made up of atoms. 3) I am made up of atoms. 4) I am matter. 5) Therefore, I cannot be created nor destroyed. **Now here's the philosophical (or perhaps, ideological) part:** With respect to statements 3-5 above, what defines "I"? Am (or Is) "I" the atoms that compose my form or am (or is) "I" the identity that I have created for myself? If "I" am my atoms, then when "I" die, I will continue to exist because my atoms will, albeit in a different form - a different incarnation hence, *reincarnation*. If "I" am my identity, then when "I" die, I will cease to exist. I think the former highlights a type of belief common in eastern philosophy (we are the universe) whereas the latter is common is western philosophy (We live in the universe, or we observe the universe). Perhaps one's identity is linked with their atomic structure (i.e., the chemical processes of the brain)? Do you think my reasoning is sound? Edit: to make it clear, I am supporting the idea that if one believes that "I" is based on the existence of atoms, then reincarnation is in fact real.

How do Buddhists who believe in a non momentary conventional self during life account for karma without enlightenment? Specifically, what happens to "my" karma when I die, if I am not enlightened and my karma has not been exhausted? I'm not asking how to think of cause and result if the lack of self identity extends from moment to moment in this life, because then "my" karma would face a similar obstacle in this life (there being no personal identity from moment to moment means it cannot be "my" karma at all). Clearly most historical Buddhists believed that karma did not just exist in the suffering I cause others, but that what comes around goes around. So if my life does not, automatically without enlightenment, generate a new one, why doesn't "my" death cut off that cycle?

So e.g. kensho is usually thought of as beginning realisation in zazen, and is into our true nature as Buddhas. Does enlightenment in all teachings amount to a progressively deeper realisation that I am already enlightened, or is that only true in hongaku theory? Is it the case in any / all Theravada Buddhism, in Tibetan Buddhism, etc.? Not asking about gradual / sudden polarities, or about any other scheme to think about enlightenment, only whether **every single enlightenment we can have in Buddhism is *of our intrinsic enlightenment***. ---------- I seem to be attracted a lot of off topic answers about whether anyone say they themselves are enlightened. I have confirmed through google that the Buddha did say "I am to be enlightened", at least, and Huineng did say "I am enlightened". Also in Mahayana sutras he claims "The Tathgata... chants these words: I am the Tathagata (etc.)". Isn't the "conceit of I am" a specific thing, the idea that I will either exist forever or be annihilated, that I am the same from moment to moment, or that anything can truly belong to me until I am a Buddha? > Conceit is developed with regard to one's possessions when there is > misconception that they are enduring and permanent. The material qualities of eyes, ears, visible forms, are wrongly held to be permanent and consequently vanity is built round them.

Should a lay Buddhist teach the Dhamma in a dhamma centre? Can a lay person teach just as a monk does? If so, are there any differences (e.g., should they sit on a different level, should the audience pay respect in a different way, etc.)?

Throughout the Pali Canon you can find instances where the Buddha appears to engage in harsh speech that seems to be contrary to the noble eighfold path. There are several important points/possibilities to understand first: 1. It may just be the appearance of harsh speech, and not actually contrary to the path. 2. My understanding of harsh speech may be too gentle compared to what the Buddha intended, and rather the way he engages in what seems to be 'harsh speech' is the norm (or limit) of gentle speech. 3. The Suttas may be fabricated and inauthentic. 4. The Sutta in question may be authentic and the speech may be harsh, yet the Tathagata may be engaging in harsh speech because he knows the limits of all actions and cannot be reckoned by Karma. There are (at least) several Sutta instances of the Buddha engaging in what would seem to me to be harsh speech. These examples are not common and they are hard to find without re-reading sections of the Pali Canon. Here is one that I remember off the top of my head: > "Of whom do you know, foolish man, that I have taught to him the teaching in that manner? Did I not, foolish man, speak in many ways of those obstructive things that they are obstructions indeed, and that they necessarily obstruct him who pursues them? Sense desires, so I have said, bring little enjoyment, and much suffering and disappointment. The perils in them are greater. Sense desires are like bare bones, have I said; they are like a lump of flesh... they are like a snake's head, have I said. They bring much suffering and disappointment. The perils in them are greater. But you, O foolish man, have misrepresented us by what you personally have wrongly grasped. You have undermined your own (future) and have created much demerit. This, foolish man, will bring you much harm and suffering for a long time." > >Then the Blessed One addressed the monks thus: "What do you think, O monks: has that monk Ari.t.tha, formerly of the vulture killers, produced any spark (of understanding) in this teaching and discipline?" — "How should that be, Lord? Certainly not, O Lord." > >After these words the monk Ari.t.tha, formerly of the vulture killers, sat silent, confused, with his shoulders drooping and his head bent, brooding and incapable of making a rejoinder. **The Discourse on the Snake Simile** Alagaddupama Sutta (MN 22) To me the tone of the speech is an example of harsh speech. If I were to use this kind of speech in my day-to-day life I would consider myself not living up to the standard of Right Speech as per the Noble Eightfold Path. I understand, however, that the Buddha controls his speech masterfully. In that case, how did this sort of speech come to be? There is no clause in 'Right Speech' that allows us to engage in harsh speech for the greater good - for example rebuking a monk harshly. That being said, do not mistake this for casting doubt on the Buddha. I consider him a good example of what everyone should act like and his control of virtue, faculties, and activities is something everyone should strive for. Also, there are several more examples. I have read through chunks of the Pali Canon and there are other Suttas where the Buddha engages in speech I would again consider a violation of Right Speech (not that I have a perfect record of Right Speech). My question is why? Why not rebuke without harshness and adhere perfectly to gentleness?

Edit 2: It is really hard to find a corresponding word to 功德 in English... Maybe I should abandon using the Sanskrit word guṇa... And consider 功德 and guṇa as "**qualities that leads to better existence in samsara or liberation or buddhahood**". --- I am recently considering a question, and thus I found that I have difficulties understanding what is **guṇa/功德**. The question is: If a person is with firm good heart (which may even be renunciation or bodhicitta), but unknowingly serves and follows unjust masters, does one still generate **guṇa/功德**? That is, approaching better existence in samsara or even liberation or buddhahood? Note: I have known that: a person with deep firm **renunciation** will eventually go further and further on **liberation path** and finally attain **Arhat**; a person with deep firm **bodhicitta** will eventually go further and further on **bodhisattva path** and finally attain **Buddhahood**. But the question that I have difficulties with involves the concept of **guṇa/功德**. So I have spend days thinking about it but I still failed to reason out an answer. --- Edit 1: Here is the meaning of **guṇa/功德** from .

I'm well aware that there are many different types of Buddhism, so I'm looking for the fortune-cookie sized description of the various kinds of induction/process/rituals/ceremony involved for the lay follower.

I read the following (here) on the internet: > Not able to take on the Jīva (stand/robe of the Arahats, eg. right view, leaving home), what should/can a house/stand-maintainer expect to validate holy in his ways? The Pali suttas say: > And what, bhikkhus, are the fruits of the holy life? The fruit of > stream-entry, the fruit of once-returning, the fruit of nonreturning, > the fruit of arahantship. These are called the fruits of the holy > life. SN 45.39 The Pali suttas also refer to householders reaching stream-entry, once-returning & non-returning. Therefore, can a layperson/householder live the Holy Life (Brahmacariya) according to the Lord Buddha?

I read SN 55.24 (quoted below) and it says Sarakani became a stream enterer despite having an alcohol drinking habit, because he undertook the training before he died. What does the sutta really mean? Does it mean he gave up alcohol and undertook the training, then became a stream enterer? The sutta isn't very clear on whether Sarakani gave up alcohol. Did he give it up? Or not? > Now at that time Sarakāni the Sakyan had passed away. The Buddha > declared that he was a stream-enterer, not liable to be reborn in the > underworld, bound for awakening. > > At that, several Sakyans came together complaining, grumbling, and > objecting, “It’s incredible, it’s amazing! Who can’t become a > stream-enterer these days? For the Buddha even declared Sarakāni to be > a stream-enterer after he passed away. Sarakāni was too weak for the > training; he used to drink alcohol.”

I am specifically interested in the attitude of Theravadan Buddhism toward homosexuality (if it has one at all.) I don't recall ever seeing any references to homosexuality in the suttas...I do recall seeing some non-normative sexual activity discussed in the Vinaya (or its commentary) but am not as familiar with the Vinaya. If anyone can speak to the Vinaya on this topic that would be helpful. It seems right to assume that homosexual activity would not be treated any differently than heterosexual activity, but the fact that I do not recall seeing it ever discussed, along with general cultural attitudes expressed (e.g., statements by the Buddha (as I recall) that there is nothing more attractive to a man than a woman and vice versa) makes me wonder if I am missing something. Also, if anyone has any contextual information about the culture in India at that time that would point to why there would be no discussion of homosexuality--e.g., it was absent--that would be helpful.