The Evil God hypothesis in Islamic theology

The evil God hypothesis posits the existence of, instead of an all-good creator deity, an all-evil creator deity. This is mostly done to point out that a creator being all-good does not need to “logically follow” from being a “maximally great being”. The argument comes from Anselm of Canterbury, who saw the Christian God as a "maximally great being" with all “great making” positive attributes "maxed out". Key examples include omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, and of course necessary existence. The argument have a lot of potential problems, one being what “great” means and why it would be “better (greater) for things to exist in reality than not”. In this context, the evil God hypothesis (EGH) is usually raised: the existence of a maximally great being whose moral character is maximally evil rather than maximally good. The EGH states that morally relevant great-making property is instantiated at its “worst” (maximally malevolent) level rather than its “best” (maximally benevolent) level. It is powerful because it forces symmetric thinking, nothing is changed except for the “direction” of maximality. Now, I would admit, the EGH is not without its problems either. Academic criticism usually takes the angle of breaking the symmetry between the EGH and the GGH in some way. For example, some have argued that abundant suffering would be better evidence for an evil creator (thus breaking the symmetry, and making the EGH less of a challenge). Others have pointed out that humans have moral intuitions that generally treat goodness as *prima facie* value. When I have brought up the argument to Christians, many believers have a hard time even entertaining the idea of God being evil. In many denominations, God being all-good is a fundamental dogma to the faith. Maximal or infinite goodness is built into the core theological picture of God in virtually every major Christian tradition. In such a framework, any evil per dogma cannot be the fault of or due to God. Evil is either solely to blame on humans (and other spiritual beings), or viewed as the lack of the presence of God. Thus, I wonder about how the Islamic response differs from the Christian one. As I understand Islamic theology, Allah is not universally or unconditionally loving to all (as in most Christian theology). Allah’s love is instead related to qualities such as obedience, repentance and justice. There are multiple suras proclaiming that Allah does not love the transgressors (*al-Baqarah* 2:190), the disbelievers (*Ali ʿImrān* 3:32), the wrongdoers (*Ali ʿImrān* 3:57), the deceitful, sinful (*An-Nisāʼ* 4:10) or the corrupt (*al-Māʾidah* 5:64). In this context, **would a Muslim theologian be more sympathetic or more willing to entertain the EGH? Is the Islamic response, in essence, different to a Christian one? Would the EGH approached differently by Muslim thinkers than by Christian theologians?** Does the EGH even make sense in an Islamic framework? I would imagine that differences in how the attributes of God/Allah is conceived and conceptualized between the Christian and Islamic traditions would hypostatize into different approaches. **The question is therefore about how fitting the EGH is in an Islamic framework and how a muslim theologian would respond (in contrast with a Christian theologian).** I must admit that I am not well-versed on the metaphysical and ontological status of Allah (and the divine attributes of Allah), especially not between Islamic denominations. Hence this question.