God as he relates to truth

I am convinced that none of Aquinas's arguments for the existence of God are sufficient to proving his being. All of these have been thoroughly destroyed, underwritten, decimated by secular philosophers, starting with Hume, and then Kant, who argued that the concept of God must be believed only because he wanted moral stability within society. Kant was right in saying that the idea of a 'metaphysical science' is absurd. This might be a contested statement, but I believe the bible affirms this too, by giving no real understanding to the reader of metaphysical concepts except through vague sentences. So, because I was so discouraged with the knowledge that I cannot prove God's existence, I realized that he is not the same as I first envisioned Him to be. I approach the issue with a look at truth. I think there is one statement that we can, universally, regardless of dispute, agree upon. This I lay before the reader: Truth is. There are no implications of this statement. There ought to be no disagreement over this statement. I am not arguing that “Truth is existent”. Nor am I arguing that “Truth is non-existent”. Neither of these arguments are possible to argue. Truth is; but what it is, how it is, when it is, even who it is, is irrelevant. To add anything to this statement is like adding a paper tag to a metal airplane and arguing that the paper tag is the airplane. It simply is ridiculous. Thus, the conclusion of this argument about truth is not that we can recognize its ‘particulars’, nor that we can somehow cross the barrier of the noumena to access it. Rather, we settle upon this, a modest yet incredibly profound idea. If the only thing we can say about truth is that ‘I don’t know’, then what shall I say? Shall I argue about it at all? Shall I simply fall back on the centuries old maxim created by Kant that subjects our whole study of philosophy to the study of cognitive structures? Shall we follow the path of Plato, arguing that there exists a world of forms that is beyond our understanding, but is perceived by a select few; a world whose existence is totally impossible to prove? Should we simply trust God, and believe, as Locke and Descartes did, that our senses are good enough to find the truth? Or should we completely subject ourselves to skepticism, relativism, and nihilism? What shall we say? What is truth? We hardly know if we know that we do not know anything. Notwithstanding the uncertainty of defining truth, of showing that it is, or is not, there is one more thing, a simple thing, a thing that is impossible to prove, but a thing that is necessary: Truth is. God is. These are one and the same. Perhaps this is a bold assertion. The words I use to make it are certainly not enough to encapsulate what I am trying say. I think it is impossible to fully encapsulate with words what I am trying to say. I think it is impossible to fully understand what I mean by saying this. Yet I think this one statement, this one idea, which no one can really understand, is so necessary, so critical, to our knowledge, to our purpose, to our existence, that nothing can more fully show this. That truth is, is both undeniable and unproveable, but necessary; that God is one and the same with this truth, is foundational, I think, to not just theology, but philosophy. When Abraham spoke to the burning bush, he asked it, “Who are you?” And God answered, I AM THAT I AM. The importance of this cannot be overstated. It cannot even be understated. It is something profound, unknowable, unreachable; yet it is something that is. It is something that cannot be overstated because it is so necessary; but it is also something that cannot be understated because that is simply impossible. In dealing with the idea of God, we ought not to subject it to any rational or empirical review; there is no ‘transcendental logic’ robust enough to evaluate this. But, by taking this theory, that ‘Truth is. God is. These are one and the same’, are we subjecting ourselves to Simon Blackburn’s critique that we are “stepping outside our own skins and essaying the mythical transcendental comparison” (Blackburn 180)? Are we evaluating truth by proposing a “second-order, philosophical, subtle and elusive theory called realism to explain [truth’s] success” (Blackburn, 180)? No; rather, we take the same view as Blackburn, who, notably, said “Science explains the success of science” (Blackburn 181). The only thing that differs in my argument is my choice of words. Truth is only ‘mystical’ in the sense that we cannot understand it. About truth we can only say ‘it is’. Perhaps this is because ‘it works’. Perhaps ‘science explains the success of science’ in the same way ‘truth explains the success of truth’; or we could simplify this to say, ‘Science is science’ and ‘Truth is truth’. And this I put a label on and call God--that is, ‘God is God’. God is merely a label put on truth. In many instances it is put on something that is not really what it is. An enormous misconception of God has beleaguered all attempts of God-believing people to prove the existence of God. There is this odd idea that God is merely an ‘all-powerful, all knowing, all-good’ being as if God were a human granted superhuman powers. Simon Blackburn, in the book, ‘Truth’, referencing an analogy Bertrand Russel composed, compared the idea of a deity to the possibility of a teapot floating in orbit around the sun. “Bertrand Russel…[compared] religious belief with…factual kinds of belief, which were as improbable, scientifically, as anything could be: the belief there is a china teapot floating around the sun, for example…Now imagine, however, that this teapot undergoes a sea change. Suppose it becomes an authority (out of its spout come forth important commands and promises) …it answers prayers, adopts babies, consecrates marriages and closes grief…Is there a difference between animation and belief? Is there really a space for theology without onto-theology, and if so, how does one tell the difference?” (Blackburn, 19). Blackburn and Russel rightly question the trustworthiness of religious belief. Why is a ‘belief’ or a ‘feeling’ enough to prove the idea that God exists? Religious belief, in these men’s minds, is an imagined, cultlike fantasy. What is the difference between a deity and an imaginary friend? This is my personal opinion: Secularists, which dominate the educational community, have dismissed the significant implications of a deity by replacing the true deity with a fake one, a straw man that was put in place so that atheism could easily topple it. Theists, however, have actually given to atheists the strawman that atheists have used to deride theism. Atheists are only right in their denial of God because theists have failed to aptly define God. How should Christians define God in light of these issues?