Reflexive awareness (svasaṃvedana) in Indian and Tibetan Buddhist epistemology: reconciling Dharmakīrti and Prāsaṅgika critiques

The Buddhist doctrinal term svasaṃvedana (literally “self-awareness” or reflexive awareness) plays a central role in classical Indian epistemology and Yogācāra theory of mind as defended by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. On their view, every act of intentional consciousness is non-conceptually self-aware in addition to being aware of its object, serving as the basis for memory, inference, and perceptual continuity. This reflexivity is often analogized to a lamp that illuminates both objects and itself. However, later Madhyamaka expositors, especially in the Gelug Prāsaṅgika tradition, critique or deny svasaṃvedana even at the conventional level, arguing that positing intrinsic reflexive awareness undermines the two truths and reifies mind. Other Madhyamaka authors, like Śāntarakṣita and Ju Mipham, articulate a more nuanced position where reflexive awareness may be accepted conventionally but denied ultimately. Is there a consistent way within Buddhist epistemology to reconcile Dharmakīrti’s reflexive awareness with Madhyamaka critiques without collapsing into either realism about mind or nihilism about experience? In other words, can svasaṃvedana be framed in a two-truths schema that satisfies both pramāṇa and madhyamaka concerns, and if so, how?