How does Buddhist epistemology distinguish valid perception from deceptive cognition?

In Buddhist epistemology, valid cognition (pramāṇa) is typically defined as cognition that is non-deceptive, with direct perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna) accepted as its principal means.However, this raises several questions about how such validity is actually determined from within the epistemic framework itself. How does Buddhism determine that a particular perception is genuinely valid rather than merely appearing so? In cases of perception, what criteria distinguish a non-deceptive perception from an illusory or mistaken one, especially given that illusion and error are also experienced directly? If validity is established by causal efficacy or successful activity, does this not risk circularity, where correctness is judged only after the fact? Similarly, in the case of inference, how is non-deceptiveness guaranteed when inferences rely on conceptual constructions and prior cognitions that may themselves be flawed? Is the criterion of non-deceptiveness purely pragmatic, or is there a more principled account of why certain cognitions are trusted as pramāṇa while others are excluded? These questions become sharper when viewed in light of classical Mīmāṃsā critiques particularly Kumārila Bhaṭṭa ’s objections in the Ślokavārttika which challenge the Buddhist appeal to Yogic perception and the authority of the Buddha’s cognition itself. Here Are some excerpts - Aphorism 2 > > *And then too, there results the absurdity of (your Scripture proving) > the authenticity of subjects other than either Duty or Non-Duty. And > so long as the Sankhya and the rest continue to exist, your instance > too is hard to be got at.* > > *Because, while being a human assertion, it refers to supersensuous > subjects ; — therefore too, on account of mutual dependence, the > Scripture of Buddha and others would come to be false.* > > *Explanation* - The assertion of Buddha with regard to the momentary > character of all external objects, has been said to conform with our > own experience, which fact has been made the ground of proving his > veracity. But the Sankhya has established, beyond the least doubt, > that all that exists is eternal, and exists for ever. Under such > circumstances, so long as you have not fully refuted the arguments of > the Sankhyas, you cannot hope to establish the authority of your > Author, on the grounds that you have urged. > > Just as human speech, when referring to transcendental objects is > almost always sure to be false, so, the speech of Buddha too could not > but be false. And when his assertions with regard to transcendental > objects come to be false, those with regard to perceptible objects too > (such as the momentary character of all objects, &c.), become false. > And as his veracity was sought by you to be proved on the ground of > his latter assertions being true, it falls to the ground unsupported. Here Kumārila argues that the Buddha’s statements are human testimony about supersensuous matters, and thus epistemically unreliable. Attempting to establish the Buddha’s authority by appealing to doctrines like momentariness results in mutual dependence (anyonyāśraya), since the doctrines are justified by the Buddha’s authority and the authority by the doctrines. Competing systems (e.g. Sāṃkhya) offer rival metaphysical claims like eternalism, preventing any unique validation of Buddhist cognition. Aphorism 5 (Niralamba vada) > *87-88. If a cognition be false, would it not be liable to rejection ? > If it were to be false even without being rejected, then there would > be no restriction (as to the reality or unreality of a cognition).* > > *88-89. For us, dream-cognition would certainly be falsified by the > perception of a waking- cognition contradicting it; while for you, > what would constitute the difference (between the reality of > waking-cognition and that of dream-consciousness, both of which are > held by you to be equally false) ?* > > *89-90. Of waking cognition as such, there is no proper (correct) > contradictory cognition, — the perception whereof would establish the > falsity of such (waking) cognitions as those of the post and the like.* > > *90-91. The fact of waking cognitions being the contradictory of dream > cognition is known to all persons, and, as such they differ from dream > cognition (which is known only to particular individuals), just like > the cognition, which serves to reject (a particular dream-cognition).* > > *91-93. Objection. : " Of such waking cognitions as those of the post, > &c., invalidating cognitions do arise in the shape of those of the > true Yogis (who know all things worldly to be false) ; and this would > certainly make these waking cognitions equal to dream-cognitions (in > point of falsity). And such invalidating cognitions too (as those of > Yogis) would belong to all living creatures when they reach the Yogic > stage ; and hence the fact of waking cognitions having invalidating > counter-cognitions becomes established."* > > *93-94. Resp:- But, such Yogic cognition is not found to belong to any > person in this life ; and as for those who have reached the Yogic > state, we know not what happens to them.* > > *94-95. Our Yogis too could have only such invalidating cognitions as > would be either subversive of or contrary to your assertion.* > > *Explanation:- If you urge the cognition of your Bauddha Yogi against > our theory, so could we also bring forward the cognitions of our own > Yogis, as invalidating your theory.* Kumārila’s point here is a symmetry objection: He posits rival schools can equally posit their own yogins whose supersensuos perceptions contradict Buddhist claims. Without an independent criterion for privileging Bauddha yogic cognition, the appeal to yogic pratyakṣa fails to establish non-deceptiveness. Given these critiques, how do Buddhist schools justify the epistemic status of valid perception and yogic cognition? Is pramāṇa self-authenticating, confirmed by later cognition, or grounded in pragmatic success? How would various schools such as Theravāda, Yogācāra, Madhyamaka, and the Dignāga–Dharmakīrti tradition respond to the charge of circularity and symmetry raised by Kumārila?