If existence is greater than nonexistence, how could it have been better for Judas not to have been born (Mt. 26:24)?

Using natural reason it seems necessary to conclude that hell is a less evil fate than annihilation. If we recognize that evil is a lack of good, and existence is a good, then we can conclude that *existing*, while lacking all other goods (i.e., existing in hell), must be less evil than not existing at all (and thus having no goods). Hence, one concludes that hell is a kind of mercy. Because God loves the damned, too, He keeps them in existence for their own good, rather than annihilating them. Even though they have to undergo almost all evil, they are still spared from not existing at all. But this doesn't seem to accord with Jesus' words in Mt. 26:24 , where He says "woe to that man by whom the Son of man shall be betrayed: it were better for him, if that man had not been born." Jesus seems to be saying here that Judas would be better off if he had never existed at all, rather than to suffer in hell. That is, not existing (and therefore having no other goods) is better than lacking all goods but existence. This question has bugged me for a long time, because I don't think there is an error in the reasoning or in the premises to arrive at the initial conclusion, and in fact Boethius seems to imply something similar when he writes about wicked men being owed punishment as a matter of justice, and that not to punish them would be to harm them even more. I want to know if any reputable Catholic theologians have discussed this specific idea in light of Mt. 26:24 . This is about this one specific idea and how it relates to this one specific verse, not the problem of evil generally. The best I have been able to determine for myself, unsatisfactory as it is, is that Our Lord was speaking hyperbolically here.