Is the Scotistic conception of the divine infinity compatible with the Thomistic conception of the divine esse (existence)?

Is the Scotistic conception of the divine infinity compatible with the Thomistic conception of the divine esse (existence)? I ask because Dom Garrigou Lagrange says the following: >According to Scotus, the divine essence is formally constituted by radical infinity, and he considers that this means the exigency of all possible perfections… > >The Thomists reject this opinion, because radical infinity or the exigency of all perfections cannot be thought of, so they say, except in a subject whose essence includes precisely this idea of exigency. This latter does not constitute the divine essence, but presupposes it and is founded upon it. In fact, we shall see that infinity is deduced from the fact that God is the self-subsisting Being (Ia, q. 7, a. 1). Besides, infinity is a mode of each of the divine attributes and not the principle from which they are derived… > >Most theologians consider self-subsisting Being (aseity, ens a se) as formally constituting the divine nature, that is, ultimately distinguishing it from everything created, and as the principle from which are deduced all the divine perfections, intellection included. First of all, according to this view, God is “He who is,” as revealed to Moses (Exod., ch. iii). This is what Aristotle means when he says that God is Actus purus. Among the Thomists holding this opinion, we have Capreolus, Bannez, Gotti, Contenson, Ledesma, Del Prado, and others. Molina, Vasquez, Torres, and others not of the school of St. Thomas side with these Thomists… Yet I don’t think Lagrange was being charitable to Scotus. For if we held Scotus’s view that insofar as being is a logical concept, it can be predicated univocally of God and of creatures, then what distinguishes the Divine Nature from other beings in the logical sense would be the divine infinity.