Does Theravadin analysis distinguish between implicative and absolute negations?

In *Beacon of Certainty* (tr. Pettit), Mipham Rinpoche addresses key questions about how to practice based on Madhyamaka philosophy. The first question has to do with distinguishing absolute negation from implicative negation. - An affirming negative (or “implicative negation”) “expresses the absence of one predicate while implying some other.” (Pettit 109) In short, this is not a good way to conceive how *appearances* are empty of any true and inherent existence: because the implied *object* has to somehow stand apart and have some kind of inherent existence that is immune from further analysis. - A non-affirming negative (or “absolute negation”) “simply excludes something, without implying anything else.” (Pettit 109) This is a much more fruitful stance because it does not hold some kind of appearance as standing separate from emptiness; and therefore it can serve as a conceptual segue to meditative experience of the coalescence of emptiness and appearance. I think this distinction is a very powerful tool in overcoming the tendency to take appearances as concrete realities that somehow have emptiness within them; and to understand how appearance and emptiness coalesce. Is there a similar distinction within Theravadin buddhism? It seems like this would be a useful distinction when exploring the 3 Dharma seals, particularly that of not-self *(sabbe dhammā anattā*). But I've never encountered such an analysis when reading in the Pali Canon or Theravadin commentaries.