Is Jonathan Edwards's view of "philosophical necessity" compatible with the Westminster Standards?

[Jonathan Edwards](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jonathan_Edwards_(theologian)) (1703–1758) was a major 18th century theologian who, though rooted in Reformed theology, innovated in some important ways. According to J. V. Fesko, in *The Theology of the Westminster Standards* (chapter 4), one of these areas was Edwards's belief in *philosophical necessity*, which Fesko explains: > Nothing, according to Edwards, can occur without a cause, and there is a "fixed connection" between cause and effect. For Edwards, if everything has a cause, there can be no contingency in the world. For him, contingency means that something has no cause. Thus, says Fesko, Edwards denies the idea of *contingency*. But this seems to deviate from the [Westminster Confession of Faith, 3.1](https://www.opc.org/wcf.html#Chapter_03) : > God, from all eternity, did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely, and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass: yet so, as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures; **nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established.** Fesko mentions one author, William Cunningham, who "argued that Edwards's views were compatible with the teaching of the Reformers and the Westminster Standards." But Fesko lays out the case against compatibility in more detail, and concludes that "the Confession does not teach philosophical determinism (or necessity) and does affirm contingency." I don't believe that Edwards subscribed to the Westminster Confession, so a lack of compatibility isn't necessarily surprising. But I'd like to better understand how Edwards's view differs from that of the Westminster Confession, and how, in the eyes of some, they can be reconciled.