Is this twofold view of the will—detached and rightly oriented—compatible with Calvinist theology?

In the Reformed view of predestination and human will, could we say that human will consists of two inseparable parts — a detached will, as the capacity to deliberate or step back from objects, and an oriented will, as the capacity to unite with or choose an object apparently good? If so, would it be accurate to say that any exercise of the will that *chooses* something other than God represents a false or incomplete use of that will, since only God constitutes the true end that fulfills and rightly orients it as true freedom? In this view, God would be not merely one object of choice, but the very source and end of a properly ordered will. All other created goods—wealth, pleasure, ideologies—represent only *apparent* fulfillments. That would mean that, apart from union with God, human willing collapses into a kind of existential fragmentation: always active, but never truly free. This would imply that: 1. Human beings retain a capacity to will and choice (and thus remain morally responsible) *even in their fallen state*, but this will is fundamentally misoriented since *any* object is going to be a sinful one. 2. Only God's grace restores the true orientation of the will, reordering it toward its proper end in Him (= freedom). 3. Thus, God is not the author of our sin (since our willing as a capacity of abstraction from any object, though corrupted, remains our own), but He alone is the author of our salvation (since only He can rightly reorient the will). Would this framework be consistent with Calvinist theology? Or does it risk introducing assumptions that conflict with doctrines such as total depravity or monergistic regeneration?