How should “attā” in the Attavaggo of the Dhammapada be understood in light of anattā doctrine?

In the Attavaggo (Dhammapada, ch. 12) the concept of attā (self) is seen to be employed not merely as a grammatical reflexive but also as a reflexive locus of ethical regulation:- > ***Attānañ-ce piyaṁ jaññā rakkheyya naṁ surakkhitaṁ, tiṇṇam-aññataraṁ yāmaṁ paṭijaggeyya paṇḍito*** > > If one regards oneself as dear one should guard oneself right well, > during one of the three watches of the night the wise one should stay > alert. > > ***Attānam-eva paṭhamaṁ patirūpe nivesaye, athaññam-anusāseyya, na kilisseyya paṇḍito.*** > > First one should establish oneself in what is suitable, then one can > advise another, the wise one should not have any defilement. furthermore, > ***Attā hi attano nātho, ko hi nātho paro siyā?Attanā va sudantena nāthaṁ labhati dullabhaṁ.*** > > For the self is the friend of self, for what other friend would there > be? > > When the self is well-trained, one finds a friend that is hard to > find. > > ***Attanā va kataṁ pāpaṁ, attanā saṅkilissati, attanā akataṁ pāpaṁ, attanā va visujjhati, suddhī asuddhī paccattaṁ, nāñño aññaṁ > visodhaye.*** > > By oneself alone is a wicked deed done, by oneself is one defiled,by > oneself is a wicked deed left undone, by oneself is one purified, > purity and impurity come from oneself, for no one can purify another. (Dhp 12) These verses presuppose that the one who restrains, guards, and disciplines attā at an earlier point is meaningfully the same one who later benefits from that restraint. The ethical logic of delayed gratification, self-restraint, and self-evaluation appears to require a notion of diachronic identity - that the “self” at time t₁ stands in a special relation to the “self” at time t₂. However, the Nikāyas elsewhere explicitly deny personal identity over time in any strong sense, rejecting the view that “the one who acts is the same as the one who experiences the result” (e.g., SN 12.46), and refusing to locate any enduring subject across moments of experience. ---------- This raises some difficult interpretive questions:- 1. What is the referent of 'attā' in the Attavaggo? Is it a purely conventional designation for the five aggregates, a pragmatic moral subject, or something else entirely? What kind of continuity does the Attavaggo assume when it appeals to concern for one’s future self? 2. If this continuity is merely causal rather than identical, why is it framed in the language of attā (self) rather than impersonal conditionality? 3. If self-discipline presupposes self-evaluation, which presupposes self-monitoring, which presupposes… ad infinitum, how does the Attavaggo avoid an infinite regress without invoking an enduring subject? I am not asking whether the Buddha affirms a metaphysical self, but whether the Attavaggo’s ethical logic presupposes a residual reflexive agency that is paradoxically necessary for moral efficacy and yet formally incompatible with anattā. Answers grounded in Pāli textual analysis, Nikāya discussions of identity and continuity, or early commentarial attempts to reconcile ethics with non-self are especially welcome.