How is it wrong to believe that a self exists, or that it doesn't?

> the one place where the Buddha was asked point-blank whether or not > there was a self, he refused to answer. When later asked why, he said > that to hold either that there is a self or that there is no self is > to fall into extreme forms of wrong view that make the path of > Buddhist practice impossible. It seems to me, and I may be wrong, that the skandhas can be identified as a self, as long as they aren't then taken to be in any way unchanged from moment to moment Encyclopedia of Buddhism, By Damien Keown, Charles S. Prebish - So I was wondering if that above silence means that any dharma can fulfill the role of that empirical self. ---------- An example would be: **Adam tastes the apple** Supposing this "taste" can be considered a kind of self, then if Adam sees smells touches feels nothing, just tastes the apple, there is "continuity" and he's *still Adam*. But as long as he does have other senses, and from moment to moment, the taste of apple doesn't make him who is he. I've never read any commentary which claims this is what the empirical self is in Buddhism, so would be really surprised that this ***counts*** as a categorical denial of substantial self .